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MAXIMS, ADVICE AND INSTRUCTIONS
ON
THE ART OF WAR.
MAXIMS,

ADVICE AND INSTRUCTIONS

ON

THE ART OF WAR,

OR

A PRACTICAL MILITARY GUIDE FOR THE USE OF SOLDIERS OF ALL ARMS AND OF ALL COUNTRIES,

Translated from the French

BY CAPTAIN LENDY,

Director of the Practical Military College, late of the French Staff, etc.

NEW YORK:
D. VAN NOSTRAND, 192 BROADWAY.
1862.
THE contents of this book are not altogether new, but the matter being set forth in a fresh style, has the attraction of novelty; and many officers who would not seek for information in old books, will perhaps hasten to peruse this, attracted by the originality of its title. The generals of Napoleon's reign understood the art of war too well for their writings on that subject not to possess great interest at the present day.

Important changes having been introduced into military organization within the last forty years, it has been found necessary to remodel and
make additions to the manuscript which was written many years ago, and which contains repetitions and important omissions.

This book treats rather of general matters, than of special and explicit theories on the different operations which occur during a campaign; it passes over numerous details which are indeed fully and perfectly explained in many classical works on military science. Its chief aim is to call attention to some essential principles, and to warn the reader against mistakes and negligences which are often committed. It is not complete of itself, but it increases the sources from whence supplementary instruction can be drawn.
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MAXIMS, ADVICE AND INSTRUCTIONS

ON

THE ART OF WAR.

General Principles.

I.

Fathom your heart and endeavor to know yourself.

See what you can do, that you undertake nothing but what you can accomplish.

Do not entertain too high an opinion of your abilities, and do not distrust those of others.

If you are free, never accept a command or a mission above your skill, your courage, or your power.

If you are not free, and if a responsibility is imposed upon you, endeavor to be convinced that you are worthy of
THE ART OF WAR.

the trust, and act up to the best of your ability.

Ascertain if your mind receives inspirations in difficult circumstances, and if your courage rises at the moment of danger; if such is the case venture boldly amidst the chances of war.

A strong will and the sense of duty often lead to greater results than enthusiasm; do not therefore despair if necessity more than inclination detains you in the army.

A recruit who deserts during his first engagement may afterward become a hero.

Persevering toil, practice and reflection can, in time, make a good general of an indifferent officer.

II.

General or private, have in every thing and at all times an aim either remote or
near, either material or abstract. When we know well where to go it seldom happens that we fail to reach our destination.

Never say: "I shall act according to circumstances;" rather say: "I shall act thus in spite of circumstances."

As long as your mind is in suspense, and you do not see plainly what is to be done, do not engage in a course the end of which is not clearly defined; it is far better to remain still than to go no one knows whither. There is, however, danger in considering too much; the mind wanders whilst weighing the pros and cons, and, generally, quick decisions are the best. Minutes are often precious; you must not then waver, and a firm and vigorous execution will frequently atone for the deficiencies of your plan.

Your resolution once fixed, whether it be good or bad, never lose sight of it until it is carried out. Overthrow or turn aside all obstacles, but reach your aim sooner or later without deviating or flinch-
ing. Dogged perseverance has oftentimes compensated for the lack of genius.

III.

There are successful men favored by fortune whose undertakings prosper to their utmost desire. Do not fancy yourself to be one of them; lay hold of every chance to insure success. Neglect no means, not even the slightest. A great final result is more frequently brought about by several ordinary combinations, either united or successive, than by a single and powerful effort.

Calculate every thing, foresee every thing, organize every thing, and ascertain exactly the means at your disposal in order to rely upon them alone.

IV.

Responsibility is the only true inspirer, but it must be individual and entire:
therefore let us have no combined operations between two men independent of one another, for the same clear and defined purpose.

If you are commander-in-chief, never call a council of war, for in so doing you place your capacity in doubt and destroy the reliance that the army may have in you; whilst in return you only receive advices too numerous to be followed, and besides mostly dictated by evil feelings, jealousy, or fear; and every officer would be offended at your not having adopted his particular views.

If you are in need of the advice of your inferiors, ask for it skilfully and in an indirect manner, and reflect twice before adopting it, even if it seem judicious at first sight.

You may have the object and the aim given you, but as soon as you are in presence of the enemy, do not accept any plan ready-made, or any fixed instructions from your government, on the manner of
carrying on the war. The selection of your person must imply the most complete reliance on you on the part of those that have appointed you; if they send you their orders from a distance, resign at once the command, for history shows that ministers and kings, who are far from the danger, cannot so well judge of the state of affairs as a skilful man seeing with his own eyes.

Remember Montecuculi, who, at the end of a campaign, returned all the dispatches with the seals unbroken, which were sent to dictate to him what his operations should be. Go further still: burn such dispatches, lest you may be tempted to read them. If you knew their contents, your mind might be disturbed and the clearness of your conceptions affected by the influence of extraneous ideas.

If you seriously believe yourself unfit for your position, do not have any false pride, resign the command or the direction to the most worthy, openly if you
can, secretly if rank or any other cause prevents you from so doing.

No man is perfect. Confine yourself as much as possible to the speciality for which you have most aptitude, and as a rule intrust every one of your subordinates with the employment he can best fulfil. Endeavor therefore to know well all those about you.

The muster-roll must not be followed for certain missions, even at the risk of breaking through the regulations. If the man whom you select is really the most competent, no one will complain. Men soon learn how to appreciate and to render one another justice in presence of danger.

Be active and vigilant in the execution of your duties, considerate, and above all just toward your inferiors.
V.

Are you subordinate, never criticise the orders of your superiors.

Respect a position full of difficulties. If you cannot alter a plan which appears to you to be vicious, remember that it may still succeed through your bravery and your good-will. Do not discourage your comrades who may be less quick-sighted than yourself; you would damp their ardor, which might have been sufficient to make up for the most absurd conceptions. Be patient, brave, devoted to your duties, to your chief and to your comrades.

Before Starting.

Private, carry only what is strictly necessary. Do not load yourself with useless objects. Many a horse and many a man have been left behind for a mere overload of a pound. A pair of trow-
BEFORE STARTING.

sers, a coat, a great-coat, two pairs of shoes, two collars, three shirts, two pairs of drawers, three pocket-handkerchiefs and two caps, one for extra duty, the other for usual wear, are sufficient for every one, officer or private, on horseback or on foot.* But all these must be new, full and well made. A fortnight of march wears out tightly-fitting clothes, which would have lasted six months if made fuller.

General, take the necessary measures for the timely replacing of every object, and bear in mind that the same article which would last a twelvemonth in garrison, requires to be replaced much sooner in the field. The regulation time can no longer be adhered to as soon as the soldier leaves the ordinary routine of garrison life; and to maintain him healthy, strong and able-bodied, his outfit must be kept up carefully, and replaced as soon as it becomes

* Add to these, if possible, two flannel waistcoats: they constitute an excellent preventive of most of the diseases to be met with in the field.

2*
insufficient, whatever be the expense thereby incurred. The only costly thing is a burdensome peace imposed at the end of a badly conducted war; the means of securing victory being always comparatively cheap. Contrive, therefore, cost what it may, to have, everywhere and always, sufficient stores, and to place the home magazines in a condition to forward in proper time all the necessaries to the smaller depots which keep removing further and further as the military operations proceed.

The two great problems of war are, perhaps, to find harness that will not hurt the horse, and shoes that will not hurt the feet.

Cavalry, bestow all your attention upon adjusting your saddle and bridle; always keep for your horse four spare shoes, with as many nails as are necessary to fix them, and half as many again.

Infantry, have light and easy shoes.*

* When good shoes are not to be had, the best
Marches at a Distance from the Enemy.

To arrive at the point of general concentration, which is always selected out of the reach of the enemy, too short as well as too long marches are to be avoided. A mean average of twenty miles is the proper measure to adopt, remembering that cavalry can from time to time clear as much as thirty miles, and that infantry ought never to march less than fifteen miles.

For both infantry and cavalry one day of rest is sufficient after six or eight consecutive days of marching.

It is of importance, when far from the enemy, not to regulate the march of cav-

substitute that can be made is that of the ancient "pandours," often adopted by the French soldiers during their long expeditions in Algeria. It consists in binding round the foot linen rags wrapped up in a piece of skin freshly cut off and laced with small stripes of the same.
alry by that of infantry, for it would be prematurely injuring the former.

The departure should take place neither too early nor too late. One hour between the reveille and the assembling of the troops, will enable every one to make easily all the preparations for departure. The men eat their soup and keep the meat for the halt. The horses take a feed of oats.

A guide, either civil or military, well acquainted with all the particulars of the road, accompanies the commander of the troop if he is not himself familiar with them.

Let us now suppose a march of twenty miles to be made and see how cavalry and infantry will perform it.

Cavalry. Departure at six o’clock. March of forty-five minutes. Halt of ten minutes, reckoned from the moment when the last division has closed up to its distance (the troops forming, when halting, whatever may be the order adopted for the march) to the trumpet’s call. The
vanguard stops at the same time as the head of the column; and the rear-guard keeps at the regulation distance from the rear. During the halt the horses have their girths tightened and their feet looked to.

Some four thousand yards having been passed over in this first period of the march, the detachment will clear twelve thousand yards without any new halt, alternately marching and trotting, in about a hundred minutes; then it will halt in a proper situation, in close column if possible, and half an hour will be allowed to the men to breakfast on the meat kept for that purpose.

The second half of the distance will afterward be performed in two intervals of time divided by a rest of five or six minutes, alternately marching and trotting, so as to perform five miles an hour.

The destination will thus be reached at eleven o'clock in the forenoon, five hours after the departure.
If the distance should be more or less than twenty miles, the halts would almost always be the same in number and length as above mentioned, but the duration of each march should be lengthened or shortened by a few minutes.

If the cavalry has any baggage, this should start so as to arrive, at the latest, one hour after the column.*

_Infantry._ Departure at six o'clock. After forty-five minutes, a halt of ten minutes, reckoned from the moment when the rear subdivision has closed up (the companies forming as they halt) to the moment of resuming the march. Afterward a halt of five minutes for every hour of march.

When half the distance (rather more than less) is accomplished, the men rest

* A horse or a mule carries two hundred pounds, harness included; two-wheeled one-horse carriages (the only ones that should be tolerated) can receive a load of eight hundred pounds. Above these limits one cannot depend upon a regular speed of four thousand yards an hour at foot pace, halt included, an average which must be obtained.
for thirty minutes to eat the morning's meat, and the march is resumed, halting for a very short time every hour.

One hour is the limit of an uninterrupted march, unless in continuing for a few minutes more the destination or the place of the great halt can be reached, but this increase must not exceed twelve minutes.

Reckoning four thousand yards for every hour, short halts included, as is ordinarily done, it is found that a column of infantry starting in the morning at six o'clock will arrive at two o'clock in the afternoon, which allows sufficient time for resting till the next day.

Should the infantry have any baggage, this should start at the same time, and both will arrive together.

A detachment that might be obliged to go and seek for beds or stables at a distance, on the right or the left of the direction to be followed next day, would do better to bivouac near the corps to which it belongs, especially if the weather is fine.
THE ART OF WAR.

It would thus avoid useless fatigues and accustom itself to the necessities of war; besides, one is sometimes better off on straw in a barn than sleeping two in a bad bed.

As for all necessary attentions and details concerning men and horses, the regulations or the private instructions that may have been given must be adhered to.

Marches in the Vicinity of the Enemy.

Marches in the vicinity of the enemy can no longer be performed by separate detachments of the same arm, each advancing at its own peculiar speed. It is generally necessary to unite troops of cavalry and infantry, which ought not to lose the support of one another, and consequently those that are accustomed to move the quickest must regulate their speed by that of those that move more slowly.

The distances to be accomplished in a
day cannot be so long, and the rules to be observed for the departure, halting, speed, etc., depend on a great many very variable circumstances. It is considered very good work if a considerable corps travels ten or twelve miles a day. If it attempts more, it loses many men, and forced marches soon become as murderous as a battle, especially with young troops.

The principles to be observed are as follows:

To give always in writing the order of march, and communicate it to all the chiefs of detachments and adjutants.

To secure as many guides as there are detachments marching on parallel directions likely to lose sight of each other.

To acquire the most intimate knowledge of all that concerns the direction to be followed.

To regulate the time of departure according to the distance and the difficulties to be overcome during the day.

To make the halts as numerous and as
long as may be necessary, so as to arrive in a mass, with the least possible loss and fatigue.

To have in every column a detachment of pioneers provided with tools, and marching with the vanguard to clear or repair the way wherever necessary. *

To surround one's self with detached corps, vanguard, rear-guard and flankers, in such a manner that the principal body cannot be attacked without having had time to prepare itself. With respect to this, it should be observed, 1st, that the new rifle is more dangerous at six hundred yards than the old musket was at three

* These sappers and miners should be mounted, in order to overtake rapidly the vanguard as soon as they have finished the work required at a point of the road. The regiments of sappers and miners ought to complete their organization by the addition of one or two companies of mounted sappers.

This idea belongs to General Henry Dembinski, who was a man of mark at the head of the armies of the Polish insurrection in 1831, and of the Hungarian insurrection in 1849.
AA. Principal corps. B, Reserve of the detached portions. C, Main body of the detached portions.
hundred; 2d, that an enterprising cavalry is to be dreaded as soon as it is within fifteen hundred yards (five or six minutes); 3d, that in full march, at least ten minutes are required by a deep column to put itself into readiness to repulse an enemy suddenly announced.

To march the baggage apart from the troops, at the rear of each column, in front of the rear-guard. For a rapid march, to organize this baggage into one or more convoys having each a sufficient escort, and following at a distance or having an ulterior rendezvous.

It results from these considerations that a corps of troops must be guarded all round for some distance, this distance being increased for a more numerous corps, as it requires more time to put itself on the defensive, however good may be the order observed during the march. If ten minutes are required by the principal corps, to make its preparations when the enemy is signalled, the main body of
every detached portion must be within twenty minutes of the centre of the column. The detached parts ought to be in all a third, a fourth, a fifth or a sixth of the chief corps, according as it is strong or weak; when strong it has greater difficulties to cover itself, on account of the nature of the ground; when weak it has less trouble to do so.

If there is as much danger in front as in rear, on the right as on the left, four detachments of equal strength should be formed, viz.: one in advance, one behind, one on the left flank and one on the right flank. The strength of one of these pickets should be reduced if the reconnoitring is easy on its side, and that of another having more fatigue and danger to incur, should be increased, and lastly, a detachment that might be of no use should be suppressed, as for instance the one on the right flank of the column, if there happen to be on that side a frontier or a river belonging to the army. Each detached frag-
ment again subdivides itself into several parts: the point, nearest to the enemy, especially intrusted with the care of scouring the country, and composed of scouts and flankers with their supports; the main body, destined to support the point; the reserve, serving as a link between the main body and the principal corps. The first is about one-sixth, the second four-sixths, and the third one-sixth of the whole detachment.

The scouts and flankers that surround the column have not only the mission to cover it, and to reconnoitre all that may be of interest, but also to prevent desertion and to see that the enemy's spies (well mounted horsemen or bold foot soldiers) do not come near the corps in march to ascertain its composition, direction, intentions, etc.

The detached subdivisions, either cavalry or infantry, dispose themselves and act in the same manner, but as a horseman, on account of his elevation, can see farther,
and, on account of his speed, can go over a larger and wider tract of ground, the strength of a detachment of infantry employed to cover the side of a corps in march must be at least double, and sometimes treble, that of a detachment of cavalry capable of fulfilling the same duty. Thus, the scouts and flankers of infantry should be two or three times as numerous, and half or one-third less distant from each other than those of cavalry, if they wish to scour the country well.

It will be difficult in practice to adopt the precautions indicated in the annexed diagram, which represents the dispositions above mentioned. It is deplorable that troops on a march are usually over-confident, and will scour neither thoroughly nor far enough; but a commander possessing the prudence which is to be expected from him, will neglect none of the measures we have just described. It is useless, of course, to expect from the scouts and flankers the correct dressing figured in the
diagram, since it is rendered impracticable by the accidents both of the march and of the ground.

Some generals march their forces, in the proximity of the enemy, in close columns, in order that the rear may be quickly enabled to support the front; but this formation is only advantageous when the columns are numerous and not deep. If they are heavy and deep, they are much exposed to the projectiles of the enemy, they cannot deploy without disorder, and extend considerably when passing through defiles or over bad roads. The last subdivisions, especially with infantry, have then to run to join the first. The order in open columns must be assumed whenever the foregoing drawbacks acquire weight according to the size of the masses.

As many parallel columns as possible must be formed without telling off under less than a battalion or a squadron.*

* One of the causes which most contributed to de-
On halting, the companies form and leave between themselves as little distance as possible; they must not form into line if there is no danger compelling them to do so, lest precious time should be wasted.

If the passage of a defile or of a bad road, or if some accident, such as a storm, an attack, a flood, etc.,* stops the rear of a column, the advance must wait until the stroy the French cavalry in the Russian campaign of 1812, was the mistake daily made by King Murat, of moving the immense body of cavalry placed under his immediate command in a single mass, often in a single column, having the same hours of assembling and of departure for all the regiments: in that manner it often happened that a regiment remained on horseback, stationary, for hours before marching off, and that the horses remained bridled and loaded for a period three times longer than that of the march itself.

* In warm climates, many accidents suddenly check the advance of a column of some depth; for instance, a ravine that was ten minutes before traversed dryshod is now a torrent two yards deep; or the burning sirocco throws to the ground in an instant a hundred men half suffocated.
cause of stoppage has ceased, for every break in a column may have evil consequences.

If several roads cross each other, somebody must be left at each crossing to point out to the last subdivisions of the column the way they have to follow.

Avoid marching in tall grass and corn, as nothing is so trying to men and horses.

Always stop *beyond* not *before* the defiles you have to pass, and near which the march is to terminate.

It must be so contrived as to arrive by daylight, and at least two hours before dark, at the place where the night is to be passed; nothing is so tedious or so difficult as to establish one's self in a cantonment, a camp, or a bivouac, when no longer guided by the light of the sun.

We must consider well before undertaking a night march which offers few advantages and great inconveniences, inasmuch as it is very slow, the men are much fatigued and individuals as well as
whole corps are likely to be lost if they once wander; and as the least attack of the enemy would cause the greatest confusion, the cavalry would then be utterly useless, and the infantry would be exposed to the risk of firing at and destroying one another.

Guides.

It is indispensably necessary in the proximity of the enemy to have guides. They are selected as carefully as possible, and compelled by force if they do not come willingly.

A guide taken against his will must always be treated with consideration, lest the desire of revenging himself for some bad treatment should become stronger than the apprehension of the death which, he is given to understand, awaits him, should he prove treacherous.

Every guide precedes the head of the column by a few paces; he must rely up-
on a handsome reward if he is useful, even if he serves unwillingly. Punishments are only spoken of when there is ground to distrust him. He marches free when there is no doubt entertained of his good intentions: otherwise he is tied round the waist by a rope held by a picked man, and another picked man watches him with his musket loaded. When fastened, he is given to understand that recourse is had to such a measure with regret, but that it is necessary, lest if left free, he should attempt to run away, and be killed.

A trustworthy guide ought to be carefully watched if any danger occurs, because fear might induce him to make his escape. Two or three safe and intelligent men are to be placed around him, who, without any apparent intention, keep him forcibly among themselves.

Although possessing guides, a commander must avail himself of all possible information respecting the positions and particulars of the road, in order to know it
well, and to be in a condition to take a decision immediately, should some difficulty suddenly arise. He must know exactly the distances between the chief points of the way and those that are in its vicinity, the obstacles to be met with, the crossings, etc. The same information should be communicated, whenever it can be done, to the commanders of the detached subdivisions, and of the various parallel columns, if the march is accomplished by several columns.

Scouts and Flankers.

The scouts and flankers are the men disposed as skirmishers in front, in rear, and on the flanks of a corps in motion, so as to form all around it a chain of vedettes, or movable sentries, that guard it during its march.

The scouts and flankers are subject in their general movements to the regulations
on skirmishing; for what relates to the manner of deploying, marching, closing, opening, fighting and retreating. All the corporals, instead of keeping in the same line with the men, remain nearer the principal corps, and have with them two or three men, thus forming small troops of support, for the parts of the line most distant or most exposed.

The scouts and flankers reconnoitre and scour attentively all the exterior ground; they investigate every indication, and impart the result of their observations to their immediate chief, who reports to his officer, who, in his turn, informs all whom it may concern.

If a scout or a flanker fulfils a temporary duty, as, for instance, searching a hollow, accompanying a traveller, etc., he is replaced by a man sent by the next corporal.

A flanker who meets with a defile, or a road opening on the direction followed by the column, guards it till the arrival of
the flanker next behind him; this one stops in his turn, and so on to the rear, each flanker rapidly overtaking his distance.

The scouts and flankers arrest and send to their chief every individual coming from the exterior, and all soldiers coming from the interior without a permission or an order. The skirmishers scattered behind the rear-guard oblige the loiterers to join the main body and carry to the ambulances those whom weakness or pain has compelled to stop.

If a village is met with on the front or the flank of a march, a scout enters it singly and questions an inhabitant: if the information he receives implies no danger, he advances further in, stops some important person and brings him to his chief. After these precautions, and after the assurance given by that person that there is no danger, the flanker goes through the whole village and stops outside of it so as to discover and be ready to announce
the approach of the enemy by the report of his musket. At the same time a few other scouts go around the village on both sides, scour its hedges and gardens, and join at the other end the rest of the detachment, passing quickly through afterward.

A wood and a thicket are searched in the same manner: one man first goes across, and two go round on both flanks.

A vanguard, in war, besides the duty of scouring the march of the principal corps, has a perfectly defined object, as, for instance, to arrive at a certain point and to await there the principal corps, which will take up a position under its protection, or another less clearly defined purpose, which is to follow and seek for the enemy.

In order to effect the first, the officer commanding the vanguard taking the proper precautions, advances resolutely in the given direction. He takes note on his way of all the indications and information likely to interest the commander of the
main body, and according to its importance makes his report at once, or after the arrival.

If the enemy present himself with the view of attacking, he reconnoitres, tries him first, then overthrows or resists him, according as he is weak or strong, so as not to delay the principal corps, or to give it time to take the measures dictated by the circumstances.

If the order is to follow a retreating force, the vanguard follows close and harasses it, scouring the country to discover its ulterior designs, ascertain its strength, its physical and moral conditions, and its intended direction, in order to cut it off or arrive before it if possible.

The duty of every commander of a vanguard arriving at the place where the night is to be passed, is to prepare the encampment of the corps he precedes, to collect resources of all kinds for the lodging and food of men and horses, and to place himself in a condition to facilitate
Detachments placed on the Flanks of a Column.

A detachment placed on the flank of a column has only to watch for the safety of the principal corps that has sent it out. It regulates its march by that of this corps, covering it, repulsing attacks, but never venturing on a pursuit. The part performed by such a detachment is naturally much more passive than that of a vanguard; yet it becomes very similar whilst a flank march is performing.
Rear-Guard.

In an offensive movement the rear-guard is on the look-out to prevent hostile detachments from stealthily approaching the rear of the column to cause disorder and delay by sudden attacks, especially at the passage of a defile. It follows near enough not to be cut off itself nor to be too long in coming up, if the commander of the main force has occasion to mass all his troops. It avoids carefully all serious engagements that would check the advance of the whole army by forcing it to come to its rescue.

In a retreat, the rear-guard has recourse to every measure for stopping the enemy; it adopts particularly the formation "in echelons and échiquiers," avails itself of every opportunity of making protracted counter-attacks, and while retreating, opposes all physical and tactical obstacles likely to delay pursuit.
In mountainous districts, where culminating positions and defiles abound, one of the best dispositions to adopt to cover a retreat is that of a series of echelons formed beforehand, and retiring successively "en tiroirs." The echelons nearest to the enemy begin the manoeuvre under the protection of those behind, between which they pass, to stop again at the extreme rear, and so on. The position of each echelon is selected according to the facility the ground affords to enable them to support the nearest ones, when, in their turn, these go to the rear.

The adoption of detachments in echelons, between which the column files off, is advantageous for protecting the rear of an offensive army passing through a difficult country where attacks of partisans are to be dreaded, as it is for covering a retreat properly so called.
Bivouacs.

Bivouacs are solely resorted to to enable the men to refresh and rest themselves. Fatigue ruins and destroys an army more rapidly than battles do; therefore, all that can alleviate the extra duties required for the feeding of men and horses and to facilitate their temporary encampment, all that can diminish the service and increase the security of the mass, will constitute the essential qualities of a well-selected bivouac.

In the first place, water is sought for; it must be good, abundant and near at hand.

After water come provisions and forage. Care must afterward be taken that fuel be in close proximity and plentiful, especially if the weather is cold and bad. In warm and dry weather the quantity strictly necessary for preparing the food only need be sought.
A soil dry and sloping, which cannot be inundated suddenly, or become muddy after a storm or flood, should be looked for.

If the season is inclement or damp, facilities for obtaining a quick and comfortable shelter, as well as for obtaining fuel in abundance, will be of great importance.

Positions where the enemy could arrive without obstacle, and from which one could not rapidly march off, must be avoided, and a preference should be given to those that command the neighborhood, where one cannot be seen, and from which the country around is easily overlooked.

It is better to make a longer march to obtain all these desirable advantages than to stop too soon and be badly placed far from every thing.

The bivouac is reconnoitred and examined beforehand as much as possible. Every corps on arriving should immediately be informed of the place it is to occupy, and of the picket it must furnish, in order that no time may be lost in waiting, and
that no one should uselessly take up a wrong position.

The order regulating the hours of distributions, of collecting fuel, of foraging, of watering the horses, of grooming, of review, of retiring for the night, of departure, etc., is given immediately after the arrival.

As soon as a troop knows the site reserved for it, it establishes itself thereon. The infantry pile up muskets and prepare shelter. The cavalry fasten their horses and place their arms each behind his own horse, so that they may not run any risk of being broken should the animals roll; and the harness should be placed near them after unsaddling, to avoid, in case of alarm during the night, the confusion which would result from a careless or irregular arrangement.

While they are taking up their respective quarters, the officer intrusted with the service of external safety goes to place the grand guard and the outposts.
Lastly, by a skilful foresight of everything, and a judicious division of the duties inside and outside, the moment of repose can be hastened and rest be granted to the greatest number.

It is generally recommended to bivouac in line, but many accidents of ground and other circumstances may render a different formation, that of a square, for instance, more advantageous. When the corps is considerable, the ground uneven, and the night coming, valuable time must not be lost in adopting long and difficult formations; it is better to bivouac in parallel columns of greater or less depth.*

The order in which the march is to be performed the following day, the direction to follow, especially for a departure before daybreak, are the causes for determining the relative places of the different arms, for the less the difficulty of marching off

* The order in line when the enemy is approaching, implies the intention of remaining on the defensive, a plan which is generally bad and ought to be avoided.
at the appointed time, the longer will the men rest.

**Outposts.**

It is in the service of its outposts that a corps encamped for a time must particularly seek for the security it requires in order to rest.

This service is of such high importance, and requires such concentration and such an intimate connection between all its various parts, that it is necessary to place it under the direction of one man alone. Every chief of corps may be intrusted with the care of establishing provisionally the detachment destined to watch for the safety of the corps under his immediate command, but a general rectification will always be necessary to bring a perfect harmony between all the particular dispositions taken for the divisions, brigades, regiments, etc.
As soon as a body arrives at its proper place, its commander sends out without delay the number of men which a previous order has fixed as his contribution for the outposts.

The chief of this body will bring it in the given direction, acting conformably to the instructions he has received, which instructions will be sometimes to take preliminary dispositions on a specified ground, sometimes to wait at a given point, until the officer especially appointed for these functions comes to place and subdivide his troop.

An encampment cannot be said to be well guarded unless the watch is kept for a considerable distance around it, and unless it is maintained so effectively that the enemy cannot glide unseen through the chain of the outposts. A mistake often made by the chief of a detachment destined to guard a numerous body at a great distance, consists in taking all the steps necessary to avoid a surprise to himself.
while he leaves behind him a considerable space in which a hostile party can form an ambush, to fall on the rear of the guard, at the moment when, attacked in front by superior forces, he fancies he can easily retreat upon the main body; the guard is then carried off, leaving the surface it was intrusted to occupy unguarded. It is to avoid a mistake of this kind that all the outposts must constitute a combined system, with the view of covering the principal corps, even in what relates to the posting of sentries and vedettes.

Grand Guards.

A perfect analogy exists between the outposts that cover a force at rest and the detachments that surround a corps in march. The strength of both varies from one-third to one-sixth of the total amount, according as the latter is weak or strong.
The chief object of the outposts is to insure complete security on their rear, and to delay the attack of the enemy, should he come.

Their secondary object is, to observe all that happens on the outskirts, and to report upon it.

The principal corps cannot be in complete security unless it has time to be informed of danger, and to place itself in readiness to resist it.

An encamped force requires, according to its numerical strength, from ten to thirty minutes to take up arms, mount on horseback, and be ready to accept or decline battle. If it requires to be informed ten or thirty minutes in advance, it must be granted that the officers commanding the grand guards will employ as much time to ascertain thoroughly the intention of the enemy, and to transmit their information; these guards will therefore be placed at from twenty to sixty minutes, viz.: at from fifteen hundred to four thou-

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sand five hundred yards from the centre of the corps they have to cover. In a plain this distance will be increased, whilst in uneven ground it will be diminished, since the enemy can then be stopped by positions, obstacles, ambushes, etc.; which compel him to be cautious. A considerable army, the front of which is of great extent, should guard itself in such a manner as to be able to concentrate in a proper place, in front, in rear, on the right, or on the left, according to circumstances and to ulterior views.

Placing of the Grand Guard.

Every commander of a grand guard having brought his detachment to its appointed station, subdivides it into three equal portions, numbered 1, 2, 3.

The first rests, but in such a way as to be ready at the first signal; the second remains under arms in front of the first (in
some instances the cavalry may alight and the infantry pile up muskets); the third is destined to furnish the pickets, sentries and vedettes, and provisionally places itself in front of the second. After these preliminary dispositions, the officer intrusted with the mission of establishing the exterior chain, advances with the portion number 3, stops at the place where the central post is to be set, plants its sentries or vedettes, composing that picket of a chief and of twice as many men as are on duty. Thus, for four sentries, the chief of the post will have with himself twice four, or eight men.

After the establishment of the central picket, the officer moves to the right with all the disposable men formed into three files, the exterior file giving the sentries or vedettes, the two others giving the men for the picket. Having set the post on the extreme right, he returns toward the centre, rectifying, if needed, what he has just done. The sentries, vedettes and
pickets of the left are placed and rectified as has been said for the right. This operation completed, if any men remain, they are distributed among the most important posts. It is usually the officer commanding the grand guard who fulfils the part above explained: he gives every one his particular countersign.

As for himself, he has previously received his instructions, viz.: whether his flanks are uncovered or are protected by adjoining posts; about what extent of ground he must watch; whether he will have support, or find no intermediate detachment between his own and the principal corps, etc.

The general outline of a grand guard and of its exterior parts, ought to have the form of a fan, as represented in the annexed diagram.

The portion number 2 of the grand guard and the small posts have, properly speaking, no sentry; yet, as many men as may be needed, are by turns intrusted
with watching the pickets or sentries and vedettes placed in front, in order to know what they are doing, and to mark all their signals. In like manner a man of each grand guard has to direct his attention to, and to keep in view, the adjoining grand guards, to report upon what is happening in them. The most important thing is, to detect at once any serious attack; therefore every chief of a grand guard plants near the party number 1, a pole with a truss of damp straw fixed at its extremity, and sets this on fire to advise the principal corps and the other grand guards of the approach of the enemy, if he comes resolutely and in force.

The distance between the grand guard and the main body has been determined above, on the principle that the former shall cover the latter for a sufficient distance to give it time to receive information of the approach of the enemy, and to put itself in readiness to repulse him.

The distance between a picket and the
grand guard, also that between a picket and sentries or vedettes, is regulated so that they may see one another. This distance, however, must not exceed seven or eight hundred yards (from two to three minutes at gallop-speed) for cavalry, and two hundred and fifty or three hundred yards for infantry. If it were necessary to plant a sentry or vedette that could not be seen from the picket, an intermediate sentry or vedette that could see both should be posted; and the same should be done for a picket not visible from the grand guard.

As for the distance between two adjoining sentries or vedettes, it is fixed by the condition that nothing should pass between or before them without being seen. It is not indispensable that they should see each other, but that each should be able to see a part of the intermediate ground which is also seen by the other; for instance, if the vedette A (fig. 1) does not see B, it must at least see as far as C,
whilst B must see as far as D. At the same time, even in a plain, sentries and vedettes should not be further apart than eight hundred yards, so as to be able to hear the report of a musket fired by the next.

Sentries and vedettes must be double, so as to embrace from the same point a whole right angle without turning the head, as in K and D (fig. 3). If, however, from K to D the ground is well explored, except a narrow strip in front of M, a single sentry or vedette will be sufficient to watch over it.

Yet, if there are men enough to double everywhere the sentries and vedettes, it should be done, inasmuch as one can go to make its report, bring a deserter, etc., whilst the other remains upon the lookout.

When, from some particular circumstances (as, for example, if it is important to guard a defile through which the army has to pass next day), a grand guard is
placed very far from the main body and forms a point in its front, it would become liable to be cut off by any hostile detachment that should creep in and form an ambush on its line of retreat; in that case it must be supported by a special force, which constitutes an intermediate grand guard. The figure shows the disposition to be adopted in such a case.

The line of retreat of sentries and vedettes on their pickets, that of the small posts on their grand guard, and lastly, that of the latter on the principal corps, must be free from obstacles either insurmountable or even difficult to pass, such as marshes, rivers, rivulets with high embankments, etc. If separating two dependent portions of a system of outposts by a defile (bridge, hollow road, ravine, etc.) cannot be avoided, this defile should be guarded by an intermediate picket, lest the enemy, after having suddenly overcome one of these portions, should, by an oblique movement, occupy that defile and
Support of the Grand Guard

Principal corps.
PLACING OF THE GRAND GUARD. 67

arrive at it before the troop which must pass through it in order to retire.

We must avoid, as much as possible, placing sentries and vedettes within range of obstacles, behind which a rifleman of the enemy could conceal himself for the purpose of killing them.* These obstacles should be enclosed within the circle; if not, they must be left out of range.

The grand guard, as well as its pickets and their sentries or vedettes, being placed, the time should be divided into three intervals nearly equal (the length of the service of a grand guard does not exceed twenty-four hours).

* After the first interval, the pickets, sentries and vedettes constituting the party number 3 are relieved by party number 2, and take the place of party number 1 in order to rest, and number 1 will replace number 2. At the end of the second in-

* Now-a-days with a good rifle a sentry may be killed at such a distance (700 yards for instance) that the report cannot be heard, or the smoke seen.
erval of time, number 2 is replaced by number 1, and goes to rest; number 3 repairs to the point just left by number 1, and remains from that time on the watch.

Sentries or vedettes should be relieved every hour, or every two hours, according to circumstances.

Night Position.

As sentries and vedettes cannot overlook in the dark a piece of ground so extensive as they can in the day, and as, consequently, they must be much nearer to each other, the circumference occupied by the system of outposts is narrowed at nightfall, in order not to be obliged to increase the detachments, a measure which keeps too large a force up all night, and thus fatigues the troops. The enemy being obliged to be cautious and slow in his movements whilst it is dark, it is not
necessary to extend the watch to so great a distance, and thus the narrowing above alluded to cannot be attended with danger. The position to be occupied at night is reconnoitred by the chief of the grand guard, as soon as the posts for the day have been established. We should contrive, as much as possible, to occupy that site at the moment when portion number 2 has to relieve portion number 3; in that manner the same portion has not to move after it has once begun to be on the look-out.

Let us suppose that the army has arrived at the bivouac at two o'clock in the afternoon, that the departure is fixed for six o'clock next morning, and that it is completely dark at eight o'clock. The portion number 3 will form the exterior circle from the moment of arrival till eight o'clock, and will then retire on the site indicated, passing through the chain of sentries, vedettes and pickets actually forming on the site for the night by party
number 2; number 1, having finished at the same time its period of rest, will repair to the place assigned to it, and will go at midnight to relieve number 2.

If the departure is fixed for next morning, the positions of the day will not be retaken, but if the army is to stay or to depart late, these positions will be again occupied at daybreak, when, if possible, number 1 has to relieve number 2. If we suppose the arrival to have taken place at twelve o'clock, and that next day will be a day of rest, number 3 will retire at eight o'clock in the evening; number 2 will form the exterior circle from eight in the evening to five in the morning, and number 1 will, at five o'clock, establish itself on the ground occupied at first by number 3, to remain there till twelve o'clock, at which time the whole grand guard will be relieved. Before reoccupying the day posts, patrols should be sent all round to see if the enemy may not have prepared some ambush.
At night sentries and vedettes should not be numerous, since they can hear sounds at a great distance, and the enemy for fear of wandering is almost compelled to follow roads and paths. It is only necessary to watch these for a continuance, and as for the rest of the ground, it is sufficiently scoured if the service of rounds and patrols is well performed. The outposts once established must not be disturbed: if any modification in their position is to be made, this must be done at the moment when one portion relieves another. A general must never take an escort or a detachment from the outposts, but take the men that he requires from the principal corps. The outposts at the time of departure overtake the column to which they belong, only at the precise time appointed for that purpose. They often are employed to form the rear-guard.
Sentries and Vedettes.

Sentries and vedettes observe all that happens on the outskirts, and report upon it, either verbally or by signals, to their pickets, which transmit the information to the grand guard; they give warning of the approach or retreat of the enemy, of his flank movements, of any reinforcements or convoys he may receive, and of the detachments he sends out; they stop all men that come to parley, deserters, travellers and suspicious individuals coming from outside or inside, and execute the orders they have received concerning persons of that description.

Rounds.

The object of rounds is to ascertain if they are on the look-out at the outposts, if the countersigns are well executed, and if every one performs his duty.
The commander of the principal corps dispatches to these outposts some officers, who return and give him an account of what is going on; the chief of a grand guard inspects, or causes to be inspected, his pickets, sentries and vedettes; the chief of a picket visits, or causes to be visited, his sentries or vedettes. The man whose duty it is to go the rounds is alone, or accompanied by one, two, three, four, or five men, according to his rank and the nature and extent of ground to be inspected. He can go either from post to post, or from a post to a sentry or vedette, or from a sentry or vedette to a sentry or vedette. His mission is to exercise an especial control, but at the same time he observes also all around him, particularly in the direction of the enemy.

The grand guards and pickets are visited three or four times during their service, and the sentries or vedettes at least once during their duty.

The person on duty must either be fa-
miliar with his route or have a guide, so as not to wander or remain too long absent. He places himself in the centre of his men, who scour the march in the same manner as that hereafter indicated for patrols.

Patrols.

The duty of a patrol is to reconnoitre a certain object or extent of ground; to go and seek for news of a neighboring post independent of its own; to search a village, a wood, etc.; to discover what happens on its front, rear, or flanks. When there is not a sufficient number of men to overlook completely the country by means of sentries and vedettes, this deficiency is supplied by employing patrols in constant motion.

Every patrol has a chief; it is composed of at least three men, and very seldom of more than thirty or forty. When it is
Patrol of 12 or 15 men.

- Corporal.
- Sergeant.

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Patrol of 25 or 30 men.

- Corporal.
- Sergeant.
- Officer.
- Corporal.
strong, it is almost always formed of cavalry, whose mission is to venture far enough to obtain news of the enemy.

A single patrol follows the same rules as a numerous body, i.e., it scours its flanks, front and rear; under all circumstances it avoids noise and any thing that might reveal its approach. In general it has not to fight; if, therefore, it can accomplish its duty without coming to an encounter, it avoids engaging either on the offensive or the defensive. The dispositions it adopts for its security are shown by the annexed figures. The distances between the chief of a patrol, as a centre, to its flankers, vary during the day from ten to sixty yards, during the night from five to twenty yards, so as to be able at all times to see them or to hear them speak in an under voice.

Patrols, properly so called, belong to the special service of grand guards; they must not venture much out of the circle of the sentries or vedettes, because, their
strength being necessarily limited and small, they would be in jeopardy at a great distance. They ought, so to speak, never to fight unless they are cut off; in that case, they rush impetuously through the enemy that has turned them.

Reconnoitring Patrols.

In order to know what happens at all points within a long radius, recourse is had to reconnoitring, or strong patrols drawn from the principal corps itself; they go beyond the outposts, and advance far to a distance necessary to obtain news of the enemy or of the neighboring corps. These patrols are under the special order of the commander of the forces, who decides whenever any are to be sent; but he may leave to his subordinates the care of composing them, or of fixing the detailed particulars, when their main object and general direction have once been pointed out.
It is particularly when the army is in cantonments, or at rest, that reconnoitring patrols must be sent. They are composed of infantry and cavalry, but they ought not to contain any strong subdivisions, lest, if they were cut off, a corps might remain deprived for the whole campaign of one of its component parts, as, for instance, a battalion of a company, or a cavalry regiment of a squadron.

Reconnoitring patrols observe on march the same precautions as the patrols, i.e., they detach on front, flanks and rear, scouts and flankers. The main body keeps in the centre of these skirmishers, which are immediately supported by small reserves, if the force at disposal permits it. If a patrol needs to pierce the chain of the hostile outposts, it attacks vigorously a well-selected point of that chain, drives away the sentries and vedettes, skirmishes a few minutes, during which an officer or non-commissioned officer, well mounted, ventures forward to see what is to be
reconnoitred, and returns, and then the reconnoitring party retires.

Like other patrols, these must seldom fight, and then only for the purpose of opening a passage in a route they must necessarily follow. During the absence of a detachment sent to reconnoitre, the grand guards should keep a more careful look-out, in order to be ready to rescue it, if pursued, and to avoid all blunders on its return, such, for instance, as to mistake it for the enemy.

Offensive Reconnoitring.

This should be entirely abstained from. These operations could only be made on a large scale, therefore a serious engagement might be involuntarily brought on; it would be running the risk of giving a battle at random, without aim or plan, in which masses of troops would be successively engaged merely to support those
actually encountering the enemy; the losses would most probably be heavy, the object desired would be ill attained, and should misfortune attend, the ulterior operations would be imprudently compromised. It is an error to suppose that if the enemy has any interest to conceal his dispositions on the spot where action with the reconnoitring party took place, he will not modify them after the retreat. But, on the contrary, he will hasten to modify them, and this, so much the more certainly, that the partial success obtained reveals to him their weakness or defects.

If you require imperatively to know the strength and positions of the enemy, it is most generally for the purpose of driving him off: prepare, then, at once, a regular attack on the most favorable point, and engage in a real battle, foreseeing all its good or evil consequences. Before doing so, it is always possible to learn nearly all that it interests one to know, by reconnoitring patrols composed of small de-
tachments, by patrols, indications, reports of travellers, deserters, and especially of spies. Should deserters and spies fail you, intelligent and devoted men, approaching singly with caution, climbing trees or elevated spots, or creeping over ravines and brambles, will easily discover the secrets you desire to know.

Spies.

Espionage is one of the most important parts of the art of war: the general who employs it skilfully will derive considerable advantages, sparing his troops both fatigue and engagements, and obtaining, often without loss or danger, results which, without precise information, he might have been obliged to purchase by endless marches and countermarches, and much bloodshed.

To know how to find, to train, and to employ spies, is rather a natural gift than the result of study and reflection. It will
be found useful to have in every independent corps a special service for espionage. The man that is to direct it must be selected from among those having a dissembling, sharp, cunning and subtle mind, with eyes now meek, now bold, and who know how to read a physiognomy and conceal their own feelings. Their demeanor will be at the same time prepossessing and imposing, and will easily conform to play any part. Citizens, unless they have belonged to a profession in which it is often necessary to read the countenances of their fellowmen, as physicians, merchants, comedians, will be less fit to turn spies to account, than peasants who have had to deal with peasants. An officer will do best for espionage, as he himself will possess more of the qualities that constitute a good spy.

Officers who do not hesitate to disguise themselves, to assume a false profession and a false title in order to penetrate the designs of the enemy, no more lie in so
doing than a soldier commits a murder when he strikes a blow with his sword. Far from it; they expose their lives (since spies are hanged) to serve their country, and the end justifies the means. Their example ought to be encouraged, and a general would be better and more safely informed by one of his men devoted to espionage, than by shepherds, Jews, women and peddlers suborned for that purpose.

Spies, to whatever category they belong, must be handsomely rewarded. If they are mercenaries, give them money plentifully, for they run the risk of the rope, and should they be treacherous, do not always punish them, because their treason may often be turned to advantage. Are they soldiers? let promotions and distinctions, be showered upon them, for the great secret of being successful in war, lies in knowing the intentions of the enemy; and if they are discovered, these men have rendered an immense service and shown a great devotion.
The information is the more valuable the more intelligent and the more educated are the persons by whom it is given. Nothing should therefore be neglected to find spies who can understand, divine and know all. With money we may enter into the councils of generals and kings. Luxembourg used to pay the secretary of the king of England, and long knew all the projects of that monarch. There are in all countries and in all armies men of high standing to be bribed.* When you have found any one willing to serve you in a mercenary way, do not rely on him until after you have proved him, and even then do not trust him entirely unless you have guarantees of his fidelity; for instance, if he leaves in your hands

* To bribe is certainly a sad thing, but war brings with it a series of evils both moral and physical, and it is not worse to seek by corruption to know what is passing in the enemy's camp than to draw him by stratagem into an ambuscade to murder him. All these means are accepted by international laws.
his wife, his children, or a large portion of his fortune. Besides having secret agents kept in the camp of the enemy to penetrate his ulterior designs, we must endeavor to ascertain his positions, strength, material resources, and moral state; in a word, all that eyes can see and ears hear, rather through soldiers or intelligent officers approaching the outposts, climbing trees, disguising themselves, etc., than through the reports of merchants, deserters, travellers and peasants, which must inspire but little confidence, chiefly on account of their unfitness to understand the military particulars they might see.

Indications.

The most important things to which outposts, sentries and vedettes, rounds, patrols, reconnoitrings and spies, must particularly give attention, are indications. A man of intelligence and experience
will often read in the indications all that he wants to know, as clearly as if the enemy himself gave him a detailed account. It is therefore necessary that in an army every man, officer or private, should know how to collect indications; it will afterward be the business of the generals, or the chiefs of the staff, or the commanders of grand guards and of detachments, to know how to make the best of those that are reported to them.

There are general indications and minor indications. The former point out the ensemble of the great operations, the latter mark the secondary operations and movements.

The sites of magazines, arsenals and depots; the points of concentration of the troops; the key of the communications; the composition of the army; its force; the positions it occupies; the countries from which it can draw reinforcements; the directions it can follow, on account of the resources, of the state
of the roads, and of the features of the country; the direct interest of the enemy; his forces, etc.; are data fit to serve as bases for the general plan of campaign, and belong to the class of general indications: they are collected from afar and in advance.

The color of the coats and of the trousers, the height and shape of the head-dress, the distinctive marks, the numbers on the buttons, the plates and the articles left behind, the number of vedettes, sentries, fires and tents of the enemy, the frequency and direction of his rounds, patrols, reconnoitring, the nature and time of the calls of trumpets and drums, the site of the sign-posts, that of poles with straw, the breakage made in a certain direction, the arrival of reinforcements and of new uniforms, the collecting of fascines, beams, timbers, ladders, boats, etc., must draw the particular attention of a man observing the enemy either in camp, bivouac, or cantonment.
INDICATIONS.

The depth, front, and dressing of columns, the number of subdivisions, the nature of the troops—infantry, cavalry, artillery, baggage, etc.; the speed, the direction and the height of the dust, the glittering of the arms, the number of the scouts and flankers, are the chief things to observe with regard to a corps in march.

The number of lines, their extent, their composition of troops, either deployed or in column; the calibre of the artillery, the relative position of infantry and cavalry; the number of skirmishers, the manoeuvres going on, such as breaking into columns, concentration of troops or of artillery at a certain point, flank marches of one or several corps, etc., must attract especial notice when observing an army preparing for battle.

If we follow a troop in march, we must carefully examine the traces of men and horses, those of the wheels of carriages, of cattle, of the beasts of burden; the
relative place of these traces, whether they are close and regular, and keep in an unvaried order; we must see if the sites of halting are few or far between; if the direction followed is covered with debris; if the carcasses of horses are lean or injured at the loins and withers; if there is any blood on the ground; if there are graves freshly covered; if some by their peculiar structure do not indicate a field officer; if the country has been plundered, the houses burnt; if offals or remnants of bullocks, sheep, and horses, are found; whether the fires have been out long or not; if they were numerous; if they present a small or a large heap of ashes; if the bridges are partially or completely destroyed; if they are left free or encumbered; if the inhabitants of the country are thoughtful, dull, humble, excited, or satisfied.

A deserter is asked for his name, country, the cause of his desertion, the number of his regiment, the name of his colo-
ncl, of his immediate general, and that of the commander of the forces, the strength of his own corps, that of the whole, if the distributions are regularly made, if the men have received their pay, how many cartridges every one carries, how many guns there are, if there are any sick or wounded in the hostile camp, if the men have confidence in their chief, and are kindly treated by him.

The same questions are made to a prisoner.

If a traveller, a peddler, or a suspicious individual presents himself, or is arrested, he is searched and examined; attention is paid to the cut of his beard and of his hair, to his linen (if it corresponds with the clothes), to the shape and softness of his hands; inquiries are made as to his name, country and papers; they ask him whence he comes, whither he is going, and what he wants to do. He is questioned on all that he has seen, heard, learned, or supposes.
All the particulars collected must be carefully noted and written down; such facts as may appear insignificant and idle will acquire sometimes a great importance, if commented upon by a judicious and intelligent mind knowing the manners and customs of his enemy. The officers will instruct their men, in order to accustom them to pay attention to the indications, and report upon them.

**Parleying.**

A man is sent to parley either for a real object or on a fictitious mission, the secret aim of which is either to endeavor to see what the enemy is about, or to check his advance, when for instance, he is skirmishing.

The flags of truce of the enemy will only be received for good reasons, and they will almost always be refused in the midst of an engagement taking a favorable turn.
Parleying is performed when the enemy is in camp, in march, or in action, either to deliver a letter or to see a chief and make him a verbal communication.

The bearer of a flag of truce is always preceded at twenty-five paces by a trumpeter. If he comes near a corps stationed or in march, he proceeds at a foot pace as soon as he is within range of the scouts, sentries or vedettes, and ostensibly replaces his sword in its scabbard. At the same time he raises and waves either a white flag or a pocket handkerchief. If he is not signalled to retire, and is not fired at, he continues to advance at the same speed until he is told to stop, but he should be careful that no one creeps on his flank to cut him off. If he finds they want to draw him into an ambush, he retires at full gallop with his trumpeter, as soon as he perceives they have evil intentions. When they consent to receive him, he stops at the sign made to that effect, and waits till he is sent for; he submits him-
self to the measures required from him and fulfils his mission. If he has a letter or something to deliver, he always asks for a receipt.

When it is during an action that a bearer of a flag of truce has to go toward the enemy, the troops from the ranks of which he sets forth, stop firing: he advances at a foot pace in the direction of the hostile force, at a proper distance, sheathes his sword, and waves his handkerchief or his flag. If he is not signalled to retire, and if the firing also ceases in front of him, he continues to approach and execute the orders he has received.

There must be serious reasons for sending a flag of truce under fire, for the enemy when successful, fancies it a ruse to occasion delay, and, firing on the person instructed with that dangerous mission, will advance more vigorously toward his object, whilst the other side would lose time.

In receiving the bearer of a flag of truce, a sign is made to him to stop when at a
proper distance, and a corporal, with two or three men, is sent to him to inquire the cause of his coming. If he has merely a letter to deliver they take it, give him a receipt and send him back; if he wishes to be led to a particular commander he will face to the rear and be blindfolded; he is then conducted. Afterward, he is brought back with the same precautions.

**Detachments.**

Never make any detachments unless they are absolutely necessary, as to fetch provisions and ammunitions, to escort convoys of wounded, or of prisoners that are in the way, to surprise a passage at a point where you are not expected, to attempt a false attack in order to deceive the enemy as to your real intentions, etc. (Even these turning detachments, whose object is a false attack or a mere demonstration, are seldom so thoroughly needful that they are...
not sent without having first well weighed 
the pro and con, and ascertained that 
there is less to fear than to expect from 
them). In a great many cases, it is better 
to move the whole army than to risk the 
loss of a portion detached or be deprived 
of its support, in case of attack or depart-
ure in its absence.

Whatever confidence you may have in 
the chief of a detachment, trace for him 
his mission in a precise manner, show him 
the aim, the time and the means; for 
without this precaution he will generally, 
when once out of your sphere, be guided 
more by the interest of his own troops 
than by that of the corps to which he be-
longs.

Never leave a detachment too long out, 
unless you wish to see, nine times out of 
ten, its discipline relaxed and its moral 
and physical conditions impaired.

At the return from a particular mission, 
require from its chief a detailed report of 
all that has happened during his absence,
and make a minute inspection of his men and horses. The certainty of being closely inspected on his return will oblige him to watch carefully over all parts of the service.

Partisans.

Never employ on your own responsibility, a corps of partisans the leader of which has full latitude. He will always act rather for his own interest than for yours, and will indispose the inhabitants of the country which he passes through, alienating them, if friends, and making them more bitter, if hostile. He will ruin the resources of the country he is in, since he can live but on plunder, and oftener ransoms a village than carries off a convoy of the enemy. In a word, if partisans rise to serve you, let it be at their own risk and danger, and never pledge yourself to support their operations, to succor
them, to provide for their wants, nor to give sanction to their acts, otherwise you risk compromising yourself. Under no circumstance, allow regular troops to act as partisans; you would soon repent doing so, the least of your annoyances being the quick and entire disorganization of that portion of your forces.

**Foraging Parties.**

We shall only mention them with regard to the support they require.

Foragers must carry their arms, marching in good order, and escorted by a detachment that sends, on front, flank and rear, sufficient portions to cover the operation.

On arriving in the locality where the forage is about to be executed, these detached portions cover with all the precautions indicated for grand guards, small posts, sentries and vedettes. The main
body of the escort takes the best dispositions to protect the operation and rally the small post and foragers, either in case of danger or of return. Sometimes, when going far from the camp or bivouac, some reserves are left in echelons and are found on the retreat. Whilst the operation is proceeding, the men having done their forage duty, come together at a given place, and when it is completed, and all the men are assembled, they return to the principal corps in the same order as they came, unless the circumstances require some modifications. Should the foraging party be attacked, the sentries and vedettes signal the enemy and begin skirmishing, the posts lend them their support, and the chief of the escort takes the necessary measures to repulse him. In the mean while, the foragers, discontinuing their work, retire with what they have already taken to the site indicated for rallying. If the enemy is discouraged, and if the danger ceases, they begin afresh, other-
wise the retreat is effected in the best possible order. Should very superior forces present themselves, the foraging expedition must be completely abandoned; the foragers throw away the provisions already gathered, and are employed for the defence when retreating. These foraging expeditions are dangerous operations, in which resources are squandered, rapine originates, and discipline is likely to suffer; they will therefore only be resorted to when it is impossible to have regular distributions. With a commissariat properly organized, cavalry forages should only be had recourse to, and only when it is impossible to find food for the horses otherwise.

Convoys.

Divide your convoy into several parts, classing them according to their nature, and place what is of the most importance
where there is less danger to fear and more facility of arriving at the destination or of escaping. Put at the head of each section, if it is conformable to the preceding advice, or at the head of all the convoy, the carriages, or beasts of burden, which move the slowest in order, that the proper distances be kept up, for one of the essential points to observe is that the column should not be lengthened or broken. As often as will be necessary to re-establish order, there will be a halt; nevertheless, endeavors should be made not to have a halt oftener than every hour, and a great halt at midway.

Every section will have for its defence a special force of infantry. The main body of this escort may be kept in a single mass, or be subdivided into two or three portions, according to the length of the convoy. The pickets sent to the front, flank and rear, and disposed as explained for a corps on the march, should be so much the more distant, as a convoy natu-
rally requires some time to take proper measures for its defence, and so much the stronger, as it matters not a little that the enemy should not approach (after overthrowing all he finds before him), the very objects he wishes to carry off, or desires to prevent from reaching their destination.

The carriages proceed two by two, or one by one, according to the width of the road. In case of an attack, the horses must be turned, so as to be protected from the enemy's fire as much as possible, i.e., the carriages outside. The square is formed but as a last resource, because too much time is required to assume that formation and resume the march when the danger is over. Moreover, it seldom happens that the space on either side of the road permits of so doing.

The escort should not pursue the enemy too far from the convoy: as soon as it has driven him off it must avail itself of the smallest respite to continue its route.

It is decidedly better to sacrifice part of
the convoy than the whole; yet, except in cases of absolute necessity, we must endeavor to preserve the whole. This must be carefully borne in mind, and, by as many halts as may be necessary, the column must be prevented from lengthening, so as to place the escort out of the power of defending efficiently either the head, the centre, the rear, or even two of these points. Now, a line of carriages or of beasts of burden soon extends considerably if care is not taken, and the officer to whom is intrusted the difficult mission of leading a convoy, is in need of an incredible amount of watchfulness and patience to prevent any break, jolt, or useless stoppage, as well as to establish between the carriers and the men, between those that go fast and those that go slowly, that union and devotion on which success depends. The charge of an important convoy should only be intrusted to a man of great merit and experience.

In attacking a convoy, we begin by har-
assing it from a distance, by disturbing the escort and firing on the horses and beasts of burden, so that by killing them, the march may be brought into confusion and delay; then, if a good opportunity occurs, it should be seized upon, and the convoy charged impetuously, a reserve supporting. If the officer in command is not intimidated, and shows himself ready at all points for a vigorous resistance, we must give up the idea (unless we have superior forces at disposal) of a general attack, and confine ourselves to partial success. We retire as if giving up the attempt, and go and lie in ambuscade near such a defile as will oblige the escort to divide; we let only so much of the convoy pass through as will give us the superiority on our side of the defile, and at once rush resolutely on this part and the troops that defend it.

It is difficult to try to intercept a convoy with any other troops than cavalry, because much rapidity is needed to harass,
to appear and disappear, to forestall, to prepare an ambuscade, or to return suddenly, to fall upon the rear after having menaced the head, and *vice versa*.

There must be very good reasons for deciding an army to carry off a convoy of the enemy, since this operation necessitates forming a detachment (always a great drawback) liable to be lost, whilst the preservation of such a force would often be preferable to the success of its undertaking. But the attempt once decided on, the officer intrusted with it must be ordered, so to say, to succeed, cost what it may. This will be the means of suggesting to him stratagems, of increasing that resolution which is indispensable in such a case, and of inducing him to return sooner.

**Offensive.**

The offensive is the essential character that ought to be given to all war; it ex-
alts the courage of the men, and disconcerts the enemy, taking from his hands the power of the initiative, and reducing his means. Never wait for an enemy at home; always go to find him in his own country, where you live at his expense and deprive him of his resources. When entering his territory, begin to act in a mass with all your forces, so as to obtain the first advantage. It is rarely wise to begin a campaign by besieging a strong fortress, or by offering battle to the main force of the enemy; frequently the entering of an open town, the capital of a rich province, the invasion of a fertile country, the successive destruction of several detachments, the occupation of a central position from which it is easy to prevent either concentration of troops or the establishment of magazines; all these operations, which offer a fewer number of adverse chances than the two first, will cause in many cases more advantageous results.

After having gained some preliminary
success, a great blow should be attempted, either the destruction of an army, or the taking of the capital town, or of an important fortress.

This result obtained, the war should be carried on with redoubled energy and vigor. An army having once established its material and moral superiority, may subdivide its forces into several corps, intrusted with different purposes, but each of these corps must be in a position to overcome all the obstacles it might meet with, and none of them should be exposed to suffer a check that would compromise the preceding advantages.

When the defences of the enemy are shaken, and when both the civil and military powers are in your hands, concentrate your forces anew, to appear formidable at the moment of concluding the peace, and remain in a menacing attitude, avoiding carefully, however, to exasperate the population until your conditions are accepted.
Defensive.

Adopt the defensive only when you cannot help it. If you are placed in that sad position, let it be to gain time, to await your reinforcements, to form your soldiers, to strengthen alliances, to draw the enemy on to an unfavorable ground, to remove him from his base of operations, and let an ulterior offensive be constantly the aim of all your actions. Do not scatter your forces in a multitude of garrisons; on the contrary, let your movements tend to increase your number, like a rolling snowball; avoid partial engagements when you are not positively certain of being the strongest. After having collected the greatest force you can expect, manœuvre; try to find the enemy in fault, and threaten him on his flank and rear. Do not systematically oppose his passage, and if it tends to weaken him, let him enter your territory: you will perhaps disconcert him
more by retiring before him than by disputing defiles or positions which he can carry by overwhelming you, or turn by cutting you off.

Surround him with spies: know all his steps, and take advantage of his mistakes. Intimidate him through some bold and well-combined action. If he makes a detachment, carry it off, employing, if necessary, the whole of your forces. When the spirit of your men shall have been raised, increase the importance of your operations.

At last, if you succeed in compelling your adversary to retrograde, press him closely, and endeavor to quicken his retreat: he will then leave in your hands many loiterers, and in a few days melt away more through fatigue than through actual fighting.
Manoeuvres.

Manoeuvres are movements made to avoid the enemy, to harass him, to draw him out of the strong positions he occupies, to deter him from an enterprise by giving him cause to fear for the safety of some point remote from the proposed object of his attack, and to draw him to an unfavorable ground; also to gain time to inure the troops, and to give rise to a good opportunity for attacking with advantage.

Manoeuvres are chiefly resorted to by an army inferior, or only equal in numbers to its adversary, and either temporarily on the defensive, or without a well-defined aim. A general who manoeuvres can have no fixed plan for it; he is almost obliged to act day by day, and, consequently, there is a sort of uncertainty in the ensemble of his projects which is often fatal. He fatigues his own men, and may commit a blunder himself instead of leading
his adversary into one; therefore, he must not only be clever, but also not have to deal with a general more skilful than himself. The best of all manœuvres on a large as well as on a small scale, either for a detachment or for an army, when the material and moral conditions are tolerably good, is to select an objective point and to march to it vigorously without deviating, for success depends more upon the resolution of the chief and the good organization and courage of the men, than upon any thing else.

Evolutions.

Evolutions are operations which are fraught with great danger, and, besides, uselessly fatigue the men and horses: woe to him that has recourse to them in presence of the enemy. The least accident is sufficient to bring disorder and confusion in the ranks. The subordinates may fail
either in intellect or in body (i.e., they either do not understand the word of command or cannot hear it), and there is sometimes as much danger in beginning a movement too soon as too late. Therefore, as the "coup d'œil" and the "a-propos" are rare qualities given by nature, and which study and practice cannot entirely impart; you must endeavor to be beforehand in the formation and on the ground on which the engagement is to take place. As it is not, however, always practicable to choose one's time and consult one's comfort, those movements are preferred which are most simple and which can be executed in ensemble independently, so to speak, of the intermediaries between the general and the men. Movements such as forming line to the rear, change of front on the centre, and, in general, the evolutions combined of other evolutions, must be abstained from. Forming close columns, and deploying within reach of artillery, or of enterprising cav-
alry, offer serious dangers. Small open columns, with large intervals between, are handy, pass everywhere, are but little exposed to projectiles, are ready to charge, and give by the multiplicity of their fronts a great amount of fire. It will, therefore, be prudent in many circumstances to adopt them at first when exposed to a sudden attack, and afterward to maintain them thus in the first line, unless it be clearly shown that they must absolutely assume a shallow formation.

Battles.

A battle is a general action in which all the corps of an army are or may be engaged.

According to Napoleon, a general must only give battle when the chances are seventy out of a hundred in his favor, and besides when it is impossible to obtain his object without attempting this extreme
and uncertain resource. If you are in that two-fold condition, give battle to end the war, to raise a siege, to destroy an army that entirely checks your ulterior operations, that prevents your advance and cannot be turned, that is about to receive reinforcements, by means of which you might be placed in jeopardy, or that gives you a very good opportunity, such as presenting to you its flank or rear, or if its component parts are scattered without facilities for concentrating.

When you find yourself suddenly in presence of the enemy, attack him; for in such cases he who attacks has almost invariably the advantage, whilst he who wavers or retires, suffers considerable losses.

Avoid a battle, if you think that the consequences of a defeat would be more serious than the advantages to be expected from a victory, if the enemy occupies an impregnable position, if you have not all your troops, and if you hope that time,
fatigue, sickness, scarcity or discord between the generals will do your work.

It being once resolved upon to give a battle, be the first to attack; the defensive, which is to be avoided as a general feature of the war, is entirely fatal in an engagement; it is a fact that the offensive, independently of its tactical advantages, excites the courage and the impulse of the men. Therefore, when you are under the necessity of fighting, unless you find yourself behind impregnable intrenchments, march to encounter the enemy, and even in your intrenchments, have always some openings through which to sally forth.

A partial defensive at a point is only advantageous in so far as the force assuming such an attitude occupies a very strong position, from which it can by its artillery join in the attack by throwing projectiles on the enemy, and even then it must not be liable to become isolated, or
rendered useless at any time of the engagement.

Let us now investigate the different cases that may occur; there are three:

1st. The enemy is in position.
2d. He attacks.
3d. He retreats.

1st. The enemy is in position. Reconnoitre carefully his dispositions, find out his weak side, then approach him, form your troops, do not neglect to put on your side, if practicable, the advantages to be derived from the ground, the wind, the sun and the dust, impart your plans to your generals, and, in some cases to every one, at least, in its general bearings, and point out the chief aim; foresee the case of a defeat and point out the routes through which to retreat, and the place where to rally.

2d. The enemy advances. Ascertain the direction he follows, and if you know of any strong position in the vicinity occupy it, but let it be such that you may
act offensively as soon as the enemy comes within proper range, without awaiting him; deploy your troops beforehand in order to begin the attack first, and to fall upon your adversary when he is making his own dispositions; do not give him time to form.

3d. The enemy retreats. Let your vanguard be numerous, composed of your best troops and closely supported, let it attack suddenly, whenever it finds a good opportunity, and reinforce it quickly if it meets with resistance, and for that purpose form as many parallel columns as the ground will permit. If you find a vigorous resistance, whilst you endeavor to surmount it in front, try to turn your adversary, for such is the human mind, that in war one is ten times more disconcerted by danger on the flank than on the front.
Order of Battle.

So dispose your troops that every arm may act efficiently, infantry firing and charging, cavalry charging, and artillery firing. Avoid, for infantry and artillery the positions that give a plunging fire. Do not accumulate masses behind one another. Extend your front. Do not fear to have large intervals (you mask them, if needed, by skirmishers). Take care, lest a cannon-ball from reverse or enfilade should carry off twenty or thirty men at a time. Three lines are generally sufficient, the first of infantry, the second of infantry or cavalry, or both mixed (the second always in small parallel columns), and a third composed of the reserves kept, according to their strength, and the distance, in two, three, or four columns. The baggage, under some sufficient escort, occupies some hollow place in the rear of the reserve. The artillery officers dispose the guns so
as to protect the troops they belong to without ever embarrassing them; it is better to fire two or three rounds less than to spoil a movement by encumbering the ground. If any cavalry is placed in the first line, it ought not to be dressed on the adjoining infantry, but should be drawn a little back, to be removed from the fire of the opposed line, until an opportunity offers itself for charging. Cavalry is usually best placed at the extremities of the line, because it has there a greater scope for manoeuvring than at the centre, being particularly enabled to extend outwardly in order to fall on the rear of the enemy, or outflank him, which its speed permits.

If your troops are good, and if, after a defeat, all is not considered lost, manage the means of retreat; if on the contrary, it is absolutely necessary that you should conquer, or if you have any doubt respecting the spirit of your men, place them in a desperate situation, as for instance, with a river or the sea on their rear, and make
them understand that their only safety is in success.

**Engagement.**

An engagement is the action of a complete corps more or less considerable, during which, the soldiers individually employ their arms. They fire while standing motionless, or nearly so, and the employment of sabres and bayonets is usually preceded or accompanied by an impulsive movement called a charge.

Begin with the fire of the skirmishers, open it from a distance, and successively increase its intensity by relieving the first combatants by others more and more numerous. Prepare close supports (of cavalry sometimes) in order to annihilate the line of the enemy's skirmishers, if a favorable opportunity occurs to charge it, especially in flank. Follow at a small distance with your lines, ready to take advantage of your first fire.
ENGAGEMENT.

Have recourse to regular and file firing only when, by the nature of the circumstances, you are certain to occasion heavier losses than those you would suffer, as, for instance, if, being deployed in a good position, you have before you deep masses that do not fire; but remember that it is better to clear rapidly three hundred yards at quick step or running, in two or three minutes, than to sustain at that distance for ten minutes a sharp fusilade, since you cannot in returning it do more harm than you receive, and since it uselessly weakens both sides without forwarding the definitive result.

If, however, you wish to mask by the smoke a flank movement of a part of the second line or of the reserve, or to await a force coming to your support, make a tremendous and uninterrupted fusilade in your front, should you even suffer losses, until the movement is completed or the force arrived.

Pay attention also to the following con-
siderations: when you occupy a commanding position with very gentle and smooth slopes, you have the advantage in aiming; if the slopes are concave, and still more if they are convex, your adversary is covered from your shots whilst approaching to encounter you with the bayonet; finally, if the declivities are very steep, contrary to the opinions of many officers who select crests with sides nearly perpendicular, the effect of the fire of your lines or of your artillery is almost lost, the shots being too plunging, whilst the aim of the skirmishers that precede the hostile column is very sure. In a soft, marshy or ploughed soil the projectiles sink in and are lost; on a dry, hard and rocky soil they ricochet, making splinters, thereby occasioning more wounds.

Employment of Infantry.

Infantry is employed to skirmish at the beginning of an engagement, then, as soon
as the enemy is shaken, it rushes to the attack with fixed bayonets, either in line or in column. The lines offer many inconveniences: they waver during the march, they are often obliged to break their original order, on account of the obstacles of the ground, thereby losing time and occasioning confusion; they stop to fire, which checks their ardor; finally, if they are forced and routed at a point, all the rest is compromised; be therefore sparing of marching in lines.

Columns have none of the above inconveniences, and if they are light and not deep, they possess many advantages. They ought always to be preceded by skirmishers, that protect them more or less from the projectiles, and prevent them from stopping to fire, inasmuch as they would fire on their own party, which at the moment of the shock, close, mask the interval, and protect the flanks of the parallel masses. A good disposition for columns would be the form half full here an-

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nexed, the officers on horseback and the drummers without arms in the interior; it would be so much the more easy to break through a hostile battalion since the front is more free for the efficiency of the bayonets.

If the battalion has only three divisions, the first should be deployed, and the two others should place themselves in column by subdivisions behind its wings.

Infantry particularly attacks steep positions, villages and intrenchments.

When a battalion charges either in column or in line, its chief must from that moment act for himself, because the colonel or general from whom he should have orders to receive may not give any, being killed, wounded, or diverted by events not connected with this very battalion. Three cases may occur:

1st. The enemy gives way and takes to flight.

2d. The enemy stands without flinching, and awaits you boldly or marches unhesitatingly to encounter you.
Disposition for a battalion of 3 divisions charging with fixed bayonets.

A 1st Division.
B 2d Division.
C 3d Division by subdivisions.
D Major.
E Drummers and non-combatants.
Disposition for a battalion of 4 divisions charging with fixed bayonets.

A 1st Division.
B 2d Division.
C 3d Division by subdivisions.
D 4th Division by subdivisions.
E Major.
F Drummers and non-combatants.
3d. Your troops stop or turn back, with more or less panic and confusion. If the enemy runs away before you reach him, he will run quicker than yourself, and you could not overtake him. You must therefore send out one of your extreme companies in skirmishers against him, for the purpose of harassing him by a sharp fire, and you follow closely with the remaining companies, watching carefully both your flanks, lest they be turned or lose the support of the adjoining battalions less successful than yours. Let your advance be prudent, and always take precautions against any charge of the cavalry of the second line, or of the reserves of your adversary. Before sending out your skirmishers, you may sometimes order the front of your column to fire a volley.

If the enemy awaits or marches also to meet you, excite your men, surpass your adversary in ardor, and enter head foremost into the opposed mass; once the shock given, re-establish order by quickly
rallying at a few paces in front; lastly re-
new the shock, or pursue as in the former
instance with a company of skirmishers
according as the enemy resists or runs
away.

If your men stop in spite of your ener-
getic exhortations and efforts, if they give
way, do not endeavor to keep them near
the enemy when their courage fails; draw
them back behind a shelter or behind
other troops, and when the danger has
become less, and you hope that your au-
thority and the voice of duty will be
obeyed, rally them and act according to
circumstances, either bringing them for-
ward or taking in flank some corps of the
enemy that may have compromised itself.

We do not advise infantry to attack ar-
tillery for the purpose of carrying it; let
it only send riflemen, more skilful than
numerous, who kill first the horses, then
the men: the horses once destroyed, the
guns will inevitably be the prey of the
victorious; but as soon as they are merely
reduced to immobility they are not much to be feared.

A body of well-tried infantry might in certain cases, and as an exception, await, standing still, the opposite infantry, and let it charge; for instance, when the men can be relied upon, and when the enemy, marching through a difficult ground, is shaken by the fire of the skirmishers, you let him advance quite to the muzzle of your muskets, make a discharge from all your front, and rush with fixed bayonets, and without reloading, on survivors.

If infantry ought always to assume the offensive against infantry or positions, and should act efficaciously at a distance with its riflemen against artillery; it is generally reduced to the defensive before cavalry, either good or tolerably so, and the defensive almost entirely consists in its fire.

When threatened by cavalry, infantry will therefore quickly adopt the formation in square, in order to be in condition to
open fire on all sides. Some nations prefer full squares, which are nothing else but close columns; others prefer empty squares. We believe the latter to be the best, as being liable to less disorder, offering within them a shelter for the non-combatants, and giving an opportunity to the reserves to kill the horsemen who should force them, whilst such horsemen, even in very small number, completely upset a full square.

Forming large squares must carefully be avoided, except in presence of a numerous and irregular cavalry, from the attacks of which the ambulances, convoys and baggages must be protected. Squares formed by a battalion alone are always the best.

A square or a column should be sparing of its fire, for it is its greatest resource. The file firing so much employed in France in the feigned resistance of a square, during the last few years of peace, is very bad, inasmuch as the smoke pre-
vents its being true; the cavalry are soon used to it, and despise it; once begun it is not stopped at will, it is often misled by a false attack on a front, whilst it masks and prevents a real one, on an angle, from being seen.

The best fire is that of a whole front by volleys, very near, and timely ordered; but all infantry has not the solidity required by that sort of fire, which needs great coolness; therefore file firing should be preferred, and begun at proper range, the troops being formed four deep, the last rank forming a reserve, to fire at ten paces.

If one or more horsemen enter the squares, the men in reserve or the non-commissioned officers must at once bayonet the horses.

Employment of Cavalry.

Light cavalry forms the vanguards and detachments; it occupies the wings, ready
to turn the enemy or to attack him on flank; after the battle, it pursues the remnants of the vanquished army, and forms the extreme rear-guard in retreats. Heavy cavalry composes, in great masses, the reserves destined to complete the victory; it remedies a check, produces a moral effect by the sight of its long lines and deep columns, and, as a last resource, covers a compulsory retreat, and prevents the victorious squadrons from destroying entirely the routed infantry.

Cavalry fights in four ways, viz.: as skirmishers,* as foragers, in lines or in columns. Its fire heretofore has not been formidable, both because it has defective weapons and is not properly trained to employ them; the skirmishers have no other purpose than to scout the troops they precede, and to prevent the enemy from reconnoitring it too closely, from behind some shelter or some accident of

* En fourrageurs.
the ground. It should never be neglected to scout a corps of cavalry, even at the moment of charging, in order to warn it of the breaks, marshes, hollow roads, etc., that are not seen at a distance, and in which it would be entirely lost, when at full speed, unless they were signalled.

The skirmishers are more or less advanced, and more or less apart, according to their mission. Should they form a curtain, behind which a movement is preparing, they must be numerous, keep small intervals, venture as far as possible, and make much noise and smoke; should they merely scour, they may be only at 40 or 50 paces before their squadron, and keep between themselves about the same interval. In both cases, when the charge is sounded, they are not rallied beforehand to avoid making a useless circuit before the enemy, but they wait, and fall into the intervals when overtaken.

The engagement as foragers is useful against skirmishers, rather of infantry
than of cavalry, against an enemy that has received a check, to prevent him from rallying, and against artillery.

This sort of engagement is more fit to deceive, or to mask another and more serious attack, than to occasion heavy losses, except when cutting down infantry skirmishers, or routed infantry escaping through a plain. It must always be supported by troops in good order, behind which the rallying may safely be effected, otherwise the scattered horsemen would be much endangered.

When foragers are sent against artillery, they begin attacking at 500 or 600 yards, gallop at once, diverging from the centre to the wings, and threaten to turn the flanks of the battery. This is a means of drawing the fire of the guns on scattered men, and of masking columns of squadrons, that rapidly fall on the support of the artillery, to overwhelm them, and take the guns in rear.

The attacks in line are those which it is
fit to employ against cavalry, in order to have more sabres at disposal, to occupy a larger front, and to threaten to outflank and turn the enemy.

The order in line is manifold; we may form continuous lines (en muraille), lines with intervals equal to the front of a squadron, lines with intervals equal to the front of a division, lines in echelons and lines en échiquier.

Employ the continuous lines against an irregular cavalry, individually formidable, or, when the ground being entirely favorable, the distance to clear short, and your men well trained, you have before you an enemy whom you must upset by all means, since you thus prevent your squadrons from facing to the rear. But if your squadrons are not well trained, and if the gallop is long, the line breaks and becomes much exposed.

The line, with open intervals, is favorable with good troops inferior in numbers to their opponents; it is then better to have large intervals, and present a front at
least equal to that of the enemy than to be outflanked. Should any of his squadrons pass through the intervals, your second line is there to turn them off.

The order with small intervals is that most generally employed, as having most of the advantages of the two former, and none of their inconveniences.

The order in echelons is excellent to prepare an oblique attack, since each squadron has only to wheel half left, if we wish to outflank in that manner some corps, inexperienced or carried away by its ardor; it is as good for engaging as for retreating.

The order "en échiquier," on a large or small front, with a cavalry fresh and renowned, will make a powerful effect in a plain, and will, in retreats, impose upon troops which are victorious, but already fatigued by a long fight. It is, then, important that the partial fronts of the component parts of the échiquier be of some extent, of at least two squadrons.
EMPLOYMENT OF CAVALRY. 141

In the order in lines, the second rank serves only to fill up the gaps of the first, it must, therefore, close near, to shut at once any opening that may occur; if, however, some ditches, furrows, hollows or points of rocks, are to be feared in the way, the second rank will at the beginning of the charge take a distance of six paces, to render the falls less numerous, and it will close up to the regulation distance at the last moment.

The order in column would not be bad to cut an opening in a line through which we must make our way, but in every other case a column, especially if it is deep, is not handy, suffers from artillery, is exposed to confusion, presents long and therefore weak flanks, and renders altogether useless the sabres which are not on the front of the mass.

Therefore the attacks in column are not conducive to success, and should be avoided; however, as evolutions are dangerous in presence of the enemy, and the ground
does not always permit of a march in line, the charge should be made in the formation the troops were in, when surprised, rather than there should be any hesitation, or than a hazardous movement should be attempted.

If the columns are of little depth, parallel, and at open distances, as, for instance, two squadrons behind one another, or marching jointly, either by troops or by division, their general system permits them to pass easily through the whole field of battle; it possesses all the advantages of the order with open intervals; the intervals, moreover, can be rapidly filled, and the flanks of the heads of column, when in danger, are immediately defended by the following subdivisions wheeling for that purpose.
Special Rules for Cavalry engaged against Cavalry, either in Line or in Column.

It must be borne in mind, that the advantage, in all engagements of cavalry against cavalry, generally belongs to him who last brings his reserves into play, and that the weak points of a corps of cavalry, either in line or in column, are its flanks. Hence it may be concluded that a corps of that arm should always be subdivided into three parts, first line, second line, and reserve, and that its flanks should be well supported. These supports must be movable, in order to follow in its offensive movements the line that advances, since this would soon be far off from the immovable objects from which it had first derived protection. Such supports, it is true, sometimes extend a long way, as in the case of the sea or a river, but these are exceptions, and though covering continuously, yet they confine the movements
and exclude turning manoeuvres, so decisive when timely and rapidly executed.

The true manner of covering the wings of columns of cavalry, is to place in their rear other columns of the same arm.

Those columns which belong to the second line must have little depth, in order to be able to face rapidly on any side. Two squadrons, in open column of troops, will generally be sufficient. The first squadron wheeling outwardly into line, would resist all attacks against the corresponding wing of the deployed line, and the second squadron wheeling inwardly at full speed, would be immediately in a state to charge in flank the enemy who, having worsted that deployed line, should imprudently venture to pursue it.

The reserve of the two lines must be in close column, forming a third line nearly behind the centre, so as to easily and rapidly repair to the threatened point.

If the first line was of great extent, the second should be composed, besides the
Disposition for a brigade of 8 squadrons ready to charge.

Disposition on three lines, of 12 squadrons, four of which forming reserve, ready for charging.
Disposition on 3 lines of 12 squadrons, 8 of which forming reserve, ready for charging.
columns on the wings, of intermediate squadrons, either in column or in line; the reserve, according to its numerical strength, should also form two or three columns.

After the preliminaries of the charge above explained, all the lines move on at the same time, on the command given to the first. If the distance to clear is great, they begin at a foot pace for thirty or forty yards, then they trot about two hundred yards, finally the first line, when at one hundred and fifty yards from the enemy, gallops and charges some sixty or eighty yards; the other lines follow, trotting or galloping if necessary. Great attention should be paid, not only to the distances that intervene but also to the speed of the adversary, for the distance rapidly diminishes on account of that double velocity.* It is also important not to exhaust the horses.

* If the enemy trots when you trot, and gallops when you gallop, you must begin changing your speed at distances double of those alluded to.
During the charge the men remain silent, until the moment of the shock, when they cry out "Forward," or "Charge." The leaders of the squadrons of the first line, who have previously given a good point of alignment to their markers, see that their troops keep their general dressing, do not come in contact with the next, and above all (except in the case of a preconcerted oblique attack), that they arrive parallel with the enemy and do not present him their flanks, as it has frequently happened on account of bad dressing and of bad points of alignment given to the leaders.

The charge once begun, the utmost latitude should be left to the chief of every squadron; he should not rely much on the orders of his commander, who may be killed or overthrown, etc. The essential point is, to act with ensemble and to conform to the movements of the adjoining squadrons, unless, however, they take to flight.
SPECIAL RULES FOR CAVALRY.

Five cases may present themselves in a charge.

1st. The enemy runs away before he is reached.

2d. The enemy stops and hesitates.

3d. The enemy passes through your formation, and you through his.

4th. Both of you stop.

5th. Your men turn back.

1st. The enemy runs away before he is reached; then, as he is some distance in advance of you it would be useless to pursue, stop short, rectify the dressing by placing yourself a few paces in front, and be ready to gallop up to charge the second line when it issues through the first that flees. If you see great disorder, and if no one comes to oppose you, send out your fourth or first division as skirmishers, and follow trotting.

2d. The enemy stops and hesitates; increase your speed, and fall upon him, at the risk of blowing your horses, but as soon as he is broken, stop short, rally quickly,
and, if your horses are too much out of breath to begin a new charge, let the columns of support of your wings form themselves in your front to pursue the line defeated or to repulse a fresh one.

3d. The enemy passes through your formation, and you through his;* you are then in a great disorder and most probably out of condition to sustain the shock of the second line; stop short, rally quickly and face about to the rear to charge on the rear of the enemy that has passed, keep behind and give full scope to your flank columns and reserves: the former take the dispositions required by circumstances, either inwardly or outwardly, becoming first line, the reserves becoming second line and forming flank columns, and the troops that

*This happened at Balaclava, where the British cavalry suffered so much for having ventured by a chivalrous charge through three successive lines of the enemy, whereas if it had turned on the first Russian line, after having passed it, the latter would have been unavoidably annihilated.
have charged form the reserve in their turn.

4th. Both the enemy and you stop; immediately start on at full gallop, the success is yours if you are the first to take the offensive: the enemy will inevitably give way, and then you will proceed as in the first case.

5th. Your men run away;* let them run a little, for it would be useless to attempt to stop them in the first moment of fright, and then you would waste your breath and your energies. You were in front of your troops before they turned, and of course now find yourself behind: follow them closely, calling near you your subalterns and best men, in order to draw them away from the mass that flees and to form, while going on, a first nucleus; then, as soon as

* It is sad to have to speak of such a case as flight, but as it occurs sometimes even with good troops, it is better to employ practical and efficacious means to remedy it than to be carried away by indignation more chivalrous than useful.
you meet with any accident of ground or any thing favorable for rallying, increase your speed, push on before your men, face them and give the command to halt, employing both voice and gesture to be obeyed.

As soon as the first line gives way, the columns on the flanks must take the necessary measures to charge the enemy, should he venture to pursue, or to detain him until the reserve comes up.

When engaging, the chief of the first line must remember that evolutions are dangerous in presence of the enemy, and must abstain from them, unless they are very simple, as gaining ground on a flank, retreating, breaking into small parallel columns to pass over difficult ground, etc.

A change of front might often be fatal; and, rather than attempt such a movement for the purpose of attacking the flank of forces advancing resolutely to the encounter and before which one fears to give way, it is better to face to the rear by a general
command,* retreat rapidly and let the columns on the wing punish this audacity, should they imprudently venture between them, behind the line that retires.

*There are instances in which facing to the rear and executing a march with utmost speed is a real manœuvre and not a rout. Marshal Bugeaud, Duke of Ialy, the incarnation of bravery, used even to say that it is the sign of a clever man to know when to run away. As an example he cited an episode of the Peninsular war, where Marshal Ney had withdrawn himself from a perilous position, by sending some one to trace on a height on the rear a new line of battle, and afterward repairing to it with all his men at full speed.

At the siege of Dantzick, in 1807, 4,000 Russians, landing to succor the place, surprised a French regiment engaged in making soup. General Shramm ordered this regiment to face to the rear, and withdrew it at utmost speed: having thus disentangled himself from among the enemy, who stopped to take possession of the cooking utensils, he returned upon him and killed or took prisoners nearly 2,000 of them. Nevertheless, it is proper to be very chary of retrograde movements at full speed before the enemy, and one should entirely abstain from them if one cannot perfectly rely on one's troops.
Cavalry opposed to Infantry.

Unless cavalry surprises infantry on the march or in the middle of some evolutions, it should not attack it on the front without its having been previously shaken by an effective fire of musketry or of artillery. Bad infantry, however, should be charged without hesitation, in whatever order it happens to be, if it is not protected by material obstacles.

A cavalry that is not aware of the moral value of infantry in position, must first test it. To that effect they pass in front and threaten it at 400 or 500 yards, sending out against it a few horsemen, who fire, gallop, and raise dust; if the infantry instead of standing firm, begins to fire, it is lost. Let the cavalry immediately charge it vigorously in column or in line, without waiting any longer.

If on the contrary the infantry keeps a bold face, is not intimidated, retains its
Disposition for two squadrons attacking the extremity of a line of oblique squares.
fire, and merely sends a few marksmen out, it is not prudent to attack it at once. You must follow it up, observe it, and endeavor to find it at fault or bring some artillery to break its order.

When infantry in position does not stir, and has also some guns, if you must nevertheless overthrow it at all costs, you repair to the extremities of its lines of squares (we suppose it to be formed into squares, because this disposition being most advantageous it will undoubtedly have been adopted), since to venture among its masses and to be exposed to cross fire would be too perilous and too uncertain: you attack one mass after the other. Two squadrons well led will have a great chance of breaking through a battalion by adopting the following manœuvre.

Both squadrons are formed in close column, perpendicularly to the capital of the salient to be attacked, and out of range: a dozen skirmishers deploy, who fire and gallop to the right and left so as not to
advance too far, and to mask what is going on behind them, especially on the capital. The first squadron divides into two parts, one going to the right, the other to the left, to menace the fronts of the square, and trot to the encounter.

The second squadron, having allowed these two parts to advance a little, starts in its turn, at a trot, as soon as they have neared each other. The two fronts threatened will undoubtedly open fire. At the first discharge the second squadron commences galloping, and charges vigorously. It has for support the two troops of the first squadron which, whilst trotting, have been passed, and continue to attract the fire of the fronts, which does not cause much harm on account of its great obliquity. The skirmishers close in by degrees, and at last take the head of the charge.

Arrived at the square, the cavalry must at all risks cut an opening; having succeeded, it gives the order to throw down arms, and carries away the prisoners, driv-
ing them toward the reserve; in case of resistance, it uses the sabre mercilessly. In case of failure, it must retire at full speed, stooping low, in order to rally out of range. A charge that has failed must not be renewed on the same side, for the dead bodies of men and horses would break the shock at the second attempt.

Should the soil sink, the horses slip and fall over, or the skirmishers signal obstacles not seen from a distance, and of which you may run foul, the attack on the infantry must be given up, for every one of your men would be lost. If on the contrary there are any undulations which a practised eye discovers, even in an apparently smooth plain, which might possibly cover the cavalry during a great part of its run, you will often, by taking advantage of them, succeed in overthrowing, almost without striking a blow, the best infantry. For instance, the chief of a battalion is on a hillock, and sees in his front a few squadrons that threaten him: he stops and forms
square, believing himself quite safe because he commands his adversary: the latter observes on the left of the square a small hollow that borders on it at 200 yards, where his horsemen would be quite protected from fire: he moves, as if to retreat, toward that point, enters it in open column of divisions, and, when arrived on a level with the battalion, gives the command: "Left wheel into line, gallop, march, forward," and charges immediately. In all probability he will be discovered too late to suffer from a murderous fire, and will succeed in his attack.

In general, ascending slopes, when not too steep, are favorable to cavalry against infantry, the latter almost always aiming too high; it is therefore an error on the part of this arm to select almost exclusively very elevated positions. Those with gentle slopes are far preferable.
Cavalry opposed to Artillery.

Cavalry should never attack artillery in a direct manner: foragers ought to harass it in front, whilst it endeavors to overcome the supports by falling on their rear. Having taken the guns it is useless to carry them away, for it causes a delay and an encumbrance often fatal: cut the traces and kill the horses if there is any fear of the enemy retaking them; and, above all, destroy the ammunition. The main point is to insure victory; with it you remain master of all the material left on the field of battle; without it the material is more cumbersome than useful.

Employment of Artillery.

Artillery, if scattered indiscriminately, two or three guns together, will produce but little effect, being much in the way of
the movements of the troops it is attached to, and will sometimes clumsily expose them to a fire it draws upon them. Employ it, therefore, in batteries tolerably strong, for from a distance it can do without supports, near enough to suffer from the projectiles destined for it, and at close quarters its grapeshot soon causes such mischief that it will be able to protect itself if it makes timely manœuvres. Let it above all avoid encumbering the ground on which other arms are moving, for it is only an accessory; it is therefore better to do without it than to let it cause pernicious delays and hindrances on a field of battle, where good order and time are every thing.

Howitzers are most useful to set fire to, or shower shells upon, any shelter behind which the enemy is protected.

With cannon-balls the material obstacles found in front can be destroyed, or troops out of the reach of an attack, for instance behind a river, can be harassed.

Canister, especially several at a time,
produce disastrous results if fired at two hundred or three hundred yards against lines or columns, particularly on a dry and hard soil.

However favorable the chances of artillery may appear, so many causes prevent its effects and its mobility that, to act prudently, you must intrust it with but a secondary part, and take your measures to do without it, should it not arrive in time, or should its fire be without effect.

Small Arms.

A soldier should always keep his arms in good order, if he has any regard for his life and safety. A blunt point, a notched edge, or a gun that will not go off, are not worth so much as a stick.

A pistol, unless fired at very close quarters, misses ninety-nine times out of one hundred; the muzzle of the barrel should not, however, touch the object aimed at, lest it should burst.
It is better to fire only one shot in five minutes, and that carefully, than ten in one minute without aiming at all. Aim is taken by raising the musket from the ground upward, because the bullet has a tendency to rise, and if it goes off too soon it may still take effect if at ordinary range. The trigger should be pulled slowly, as any sudden jerk produces a shock which entirely deranges the aim.

In a hurried encounter the sabre or bayonet exercise is of little avail; you thrust or cut according as your impulse or the enemy's peculiar position invites you. Lance thrusts are made to the front, to the right, to the left, or to the ground, but to the rear the right and left parry is only employed. The thrust of a lance is uncertain, but the blow of its staff given whilst parrying can be very serious.

When thrusting at an adversary take care that you are not both advancing with the same speed in opposite directions: in this case scarcely extend your arm, and
withdraw it immediately, otherwise either you will sprain your wrist, or your weapon, penetrating too far, would remain in the body you have pierced. If the enemy you aim at is going in the same direction, or if you are both standing still, the arm must be vigorously extended.

It too often happens that in endeavoring to kill the man and capture his horse, the attempt is unsuccessful, and the attacker is killed himself: a man on foot ought always to aim first at the horse, and a horseman will have nine chances to ten if he do the same, especially against cuirassiers.

Corps of Reserve.

Many military men think that reserves ought to be employed during the actual time of battle only, for the simple purpose of completing the victory when it remains doubtful, after the efforts of the troops of the line, or to remedy a severe check re-
ceived by the latter; and, indeed, such has been too often their only employment: how many sanguinary combats have taken place without any result, triumphs been turned into reverses, defeats turned into complete routs, and all this because the reserve has been confounded with picked troops placed as supports in the third and fourth line (where they are exposed to suffer in the combat, to take part in it, and to be as exhausted as the others when there is still much to be done), and because it has been neglected to have a corps perfectly fresh and ready for any accident that may occur. The arrival of Desaix's division at the battle of Marengo when the consular guard had failed in deciding the advantage in favor of the French, explains the distinction to be made.

It should, however, be repeated here, that battle should only be given when success is almost certain, yet prudence should foresee the case in which we might be beaten. If successful the victory must be
turned to account, if not, one would be to blame for having let thousands of men perish without any real advantage. The evacuation by the enemy, of the ground on which the battle took place, is what is generally called a victory. Such an evacuation is not necessarily the consequence of great losses, of disorganization or of disorder, and it has frequently happened that the enemy has only withdrawn to be in a better condition for continuing the war, or renewing the struggle after having rallied. The victorious troops often suffer more than the vanquished; they are fatigued, disorganized, their chiefs are killed or wounded, and it is difficult to obtain from them any thing more than encamping on the field of battle, a great but empty honor.

If at the time when, under the attacks of the 1st, 2d, and 3d lines, the opposing army gives way and retires, a fresh body advances against it, charges it, hinders it, from forming its broken ranks, from pro-
viding new horses for the pieces it has preserved, and, above all, prevents its taking that repose, of which it has such need after a fatiguing day of fight, it only remains for it to attempt a renewed resistance, in which its physical and moral states would probably succumb altogether, or to fly, and then its debris would soon be taken or dispersed: in either case its destruction would be complete. But we have just said that it is only a fresh corps that can obtain this result. The reserve must then be kept out of danger, and beyond the range of fire, in order that the men and animals it is composed of should be exempt from fatigue, and have time to take necessary nourishment. It is a second army, which comes into action when the first had already routed the enemy, and being a second army it is composed of all kinds of troops: light troops to pursue or engage in a renewed fight, troops of the line to assist those who have gone before, and picked men to overcome all
resistance. Cavalry ought to predominate in it, for rapidity of attacks and movements against an enemy we are desirous of overthrowing, is the essential requisite for success; however, infantry and artillery must be employed, and these should be picked troops, on hilly ground, against positions intrenched and naturally strong, so as easily to support cavalry, and not be long delayed by these difficulties.

If, instead of being victorious, we are beaten, it is none the less important to bring forward a fresh corps in a fit condition for the wreck of the retiring army, which is to be saved and reorganized, to rally and form behind it; this fresh army would, by repeated and vigorous charges, allow the survivors to get quickly away from a dangerous neighborhood, and, in a word, facilitate the retreat of the most entangled cavalry, by employing for their protection artillery and squares, advantageously posted on the height, or on the flanks of defiles.
In order that the reserve may be prepared for the critical juncture of a retreat, as well as for a hurried and bloody pursuit, it must be composed of picked men, or at all events of steady and proved troops. As the general in command is left to use his own judgment, his duty is a very important one, and his decisions must be prompt; he should be chosen full of experience in war, accustomed to handle troops of all arms, bold and prudent at the same time, and endowed, in short, with all the qualities desirable in a commander-in-chief.

As to the strength of the reserve, it should amount to one-fourth or one-sixth of the whole army; if the latter is composed of three nearly equal corps, called the right wing, centre, and left wing, having each the same amount of infantry, cavalry, and artillery, say two divisions of the first, and one of the second, then the reserve will be formed of one division of infantry, and two of cavalry.
RETREATS.

Retreats.

If you are weak and have to retire, take care to decide upon it early, and be well prepared, for it is better to take up a position and engage the enemy with your whole force, and then, if victorious not to pursue, and think yourself fortunate that you are not pursued, than have him always at your heels and be obliged to turn every minute to repel him. You would probably lose fewer men on the whole, than you would leave behind you day after day during your retreat, in stragglers, deserters, killed and taken prisoners, in combats always disadvantageous to those acting on the defensive.

A retrograde movement can only be advantageous, when sufficiently in advance to render the enemy's pursuit unavailing. If possible, it is directed across a hilly country, where such obstacles can be created as may retard the pursuing army,
and force it to be more cautious, since its vanguard would be exposed to ambus-
cades and skirmishes.

If there is any fear of being overtaken, and if at the same time we are able to re-
sist the enemy's attack with our whole force, we retire in parallel columns a little apart from each other, and able mutually to support one another. If on the contra-
ry safety depends only on the rapidity of movements, and if all the columns united are unable to defend themselves with any chance of success, we must give them di-
verging routes, in the hope that they will retire the more promptly, and will force the enemy to divide so that some, at least, may escape; then direct them to some fur-
ther position or strong place where they will find shelter.

The extreme rear-guard of a retreating column ought to be especially composed of troops of cavalry that stop the enemy, till the baggage and infantry have filed off, and then rejoin at a sharp trot. If
some of these cavalry are armed with carbines and are capable of making a tolerable resistance, when alighting at defiles, woods, and broken ground, and are accompanied by good, light artillery, they could entirely dispense with infantry, unless the surrounding country be mountainous or intersected by hedges, ditches, canals, etc., etc.

The movements in *echelons*, and in *échiquier* are very favorable to the rear-guard, which ought to have recourse to them in preference to the *passage of lines*; these last are often disorderly, owing to the intervals being generally too short.

**Victualling.**

Next to money, provisions are the chief requisites for carrying on the war. If they are not secured daily, desertion, plunder, insubordination, relaxation of discipline, invasion of sickness and general
demoralization, will, in a very short time, destroy the most brilliant army.

If the food of both men and horses is insufficient, they cannot long endure fatigue, they grow thin, lose their health, lag behind, and very shortly die miserably.

It may be asserted that in most of the European armies, in the French and even in the British, the daily ration is not plentiful enough, especially in meat for the men, and corn for the horses. A convincing proof of this fact is, that when the former procure a very large addition to their meals, and when the latter receive four or six pounds of corn extra every day, they consume the whole and are the better for it.

Let us compare what an officer eats with ordinary appetite, who can, with money, secure all he wishes with the regulation ration, and we shall soon perceive that the latter is one-third too short of the required quantity. Moreover, make this experiment: distribute provisions to the
troops for eight days, and tell them that every four days the four rations consumed will be replaced, you may depend upon it, on the fourth day (if they have marched and have been recommended to keep their provisions, and even in spite of such order), that there will only be left in the knapsack provisions for one day, instead of four days.*

A soldier who marches, is on guard part of the night, goes on rounds and patrols, cleans his arms, grooms his horse and goes on extra duty, and often very far to collect fuel and forage, has altogether very hard work, and requires a plentiful supply of food to restore his lost strength. The

* Soldiers are sometimes made to sew up their reserve rations in a bag to prevent their touching them without permission before the time; this is simply adding vexation to privation.

Give them sufficient for each day, and they will carefully keep that which has to last them for some time; but should they be assailed by hunger, they will run the risk of a slight punishment, rip open their sacks, and break their discipline by disobedience.
actual rations of biscuit, meat, sugar and coffee ought to be increased by one-third.*

Not only the cause of humanity but also that of war would benefit by it, and one would not see so many men in the ambulances and hospitals, nor witness so many inglorious deaths caused by sickness and sheer privation.

If on the other hand we consider the weight of food consumed by a horse employed in most of the works of civil life, we see that it is, especially in corn, sometimes double the allowance of that of the cavalry horses, and yet the least loaded

* The rations for men and horses were fixed at a time when armies were mercenary, when the scum of the populace joining the ranks, little was done for their preservation, when the administration of companies was such that government had to guard against its abuse, and lastly when supplies were relatively much dearer to buy, and much more difficult to transport. Although great improvements have by degrees been made in the condition of the troops, especially lately in the Crimea, still, the true requisites of war and men are not yet supplied by the regulations.
among these is subjected to greater fatigue than are imposed upon the same animal in agriculture, in draught, and the ordinary public service; one cannot therefore wonder if a regiment of cavalry melts so rapidly on a march, and, that in the wars of Napoleon so many horses were lost without the enemy doing anything toward it.

In the field, twenty pints of corn a head ought to be allowed to horses of light cavalry, and from twenty-eight to thirty to those of heavy cavalry and artillery. With this amount of substantial nourishment, little hay or straw is required, which is burdensome to transport, and which it is very often difficult to make the horses eat, when they are for instance, bivouacking in the rain, mud, or dust.

It is true that this augmentation of the supplies costs much; but with regard to the men, the reason for economy ought not to be opposed to those of humanity, and as for the horses, the decrease of loss would
certainly make up for part of the increased expenditure (if not for the whole) arising from the augmentation of the rations.

A general who wishes to be free in his movements (an essential condition for success), ought to have constantly with him ten days' provisions, carried partly by his men and partly by a convoy that constantly accompanies the army. As in the presence of the enemy the marches are short, and are interrupted from time to time, it will always be possible to take such administrative measures as to be able to replace continuously the consumed supplies by fresh ones. Fresh meat, which is so essential to the preservation of health, besides being able to transport itself, and to carry a certain load, diminishes in many ways the difficulties of the commissariat.

In an offensive war, the provisions should not be kept in front of the army, since they would be too liable to become the prey of the enemy, nor in the rear, for they would take too much trouble to bring
up, transport being always slow; they should be conveyed chiefly on the flanks (when these are secure), so that they may by oblique roads come daily together on the spot where the army stops.

Nothing being more pernicious than retreating after having advanced, an act always badly interpreted in both camps; it is preferable to make short marches, and even to remain stationary a day or two, to give the convoys time to arrive than to push on for some distance, and then be obliged to retrace one's steps for want of provisions.

In a country rich in resources and well peopled, however hostile it may be, one always finds means to subsist, especially by paying liberally for all requisites. War can be fed by war, without foraging, and without imposing forced contributions of supplies (which exasperates the inhabitants, and exhausts the country, because more is taken than there is occasion for). To this effect it should be announced that
all provisions brought to such and such a place will be paid for with ready money, and immediately after a pecuniary contribution is exacted from towns and local or governmental administrations. We might also begin by levying this tax, and afterward demand supplies by promising they will be liberally paid for. The people will be all the readier to supply you with the requisites, as it is a means of recovering the tax money.

By the application of this system, we avoid an act that appears like spoliation, and replace it by a tax for which the actual authorities are made responsible; this tax falling less heavily on the poor than on the rich, and more on public than on private means, is almost everywhere readily accepted.

When the roads or paths are only practicable for light cars, drawn by oxen, these vehicles are sometimes very advantageous, because the animals serve as food when they are no longer required for draught.
Horses and mules are excellent beasts of burden, yet they present this great drawback, that to be of much service they require large rations of barley and oats, often more difficult to meet with on the way than the provisions they themselves have to carry, and then their effective load is reduced by the weight of the corn they consume, which, at the rate of 10 pounds a day amounts to 100 pounds in ten days. If we consider that a beast of burden, at the risk of being soon out of condition, cannot carry much above 200 pounds, of which 40 are for harness and driver's luggage, we perceive that the fraction of this load representing the provisions for ulterior consumption is only 60 pounds; or making allowance for waste, about 24 rations for men (biscuit and small articles), and 5 rations (barley or oats) for horses; if a proper victualling rate is observed. Dividing the ten days' provisions in the following manner: 4 rations to infantry, 2 to cavalry, there will remain to be transport-
ed 6 rations for infantry, and 8 for cavalry, besides all the corn for the latter, for if even part of this corn were put on the cavalry horses (which too often happens), we should run the risk of injuring them and of unfitting them for the occasion when they are most needed.

From the above considerations it results that the number of beasts of burden necessary to insure the victualling of an army of 100,000 men, during ten days only, would be exorbitant, and almost impossible to provide. The number of draught-horses and carriages for the above exigencies where there are practicable roads, would still be 10,000 of the former and 5,000 of the latter, supposing a horse draws six or seven times what he can carry.

As, on the other hand, large convoys considerably retard, and render the movement of the army difficult, we are led to establish as a rule, that to carry on an offensive war in a country where sufficient resources will not be found every day (and
we must always keep in mind that the enemy destroys them when any are to be found in ordinary times), the best line of operations to follow is a navigable river or maritime frontier, provided we have the entire command of them, since a vessel, or even a simple boat can easily transport an immense weight. A railway would also offer facilities for provisioning an army, if the rolling stock and rails could be constantly protected whilst it advances, or even be repaired when damaged.

It does not suffice that an army should find between very narrow limits of time, for example, every twenty-four or forty-eight hours, its supplies collected in its neighborhood in a port, station, or temporary magazine; we must, besides, in order not to fatigue the men and horses by their having to go far for the distribution, send their provisions daily, or sufficient for two days, to their actual quarters. To effect this, there should be a proper number of carriages, or of beasts of burden,
to convey the provisions and forage to every camp, bivouac, or cantonment. The beasts and their drivers, organized into troops corresponding to the divisions, brigades, regiments, battalions, etc., pass the night with the troops they have just victualled, and march unloaded next day, converging to the point of concentration of the provisions, to return again with a fresh load to the corps they respectively supply.

**Officers' Mess in the Field.**

Frederick the Great in his armies fixed rules for every thing; the number of carriages and horses allotted to every corps; to every officer, according to his rank, the number of suits of clothes of every description, and even the number of dishes that should appear on the table, as well of the commander-in-chief as of the generals, colonels, etc.
Without desiring regulations so severe and minute as those of the king of Prussia, we think that it would be very useful to have certain rules that might be easily followed in a campaign concerning the organization and the management of the officers' mess. The impossibility of boarding anywhere, as in garrison, the exigencies of a perpetual bivouac, which in war replaces the easy method of lodging with the inhabitants, as was customary in the wars of the beginning of this century, the scanty means of the greater part who cannot afford mules, canteens, kitchen utensils, and comfortable provisions; the irregularity thereby introduced in the interior of the corps; the painful feeling arising from the fact that among the same rank, and with equal dangers, the material condition is so different; in a word, a thousand reasons require that the mess of the officers should be uniformly regulated as soon as the troops are assembled and concentrated into active divisions.
Messing together according to rank, or by battalion or half-battalion in the infantry, regiment or half-regiment in the cavalry, is the only plan that possesses all advantages without offering any inconvenience. Discipline and subordination are too much exposed to suffer when all the ranks of the hierarchy are mixed at a table, and to avoid this there ought to be an amount of education and of similarity of dispositions which it is impossible to find in a reunion of men who have obtained their grade of officer by different means. Lieutenants and ensigns on one side and captains on the other, must therefore live together, or in two groups, according as the officering of the corps is small or numerous, complete or incomplete.

Majors and lieutenant-colonels can mess alone, or two, three, or four together; but it is important that the chiefs of corps, and of detachments, should take their meals alone, because the reserve so necessary for a commander might sometimes
fail him in the presence of subordinates who are his daily companions. By living together according to rank, good fellowship retains all its claims and advantages, and egotism disappears. A rich officer can, without hurting any one's feelings, present now and then some delicacy or a fine wine, which a long privation of dainties will make particularly acceptable to every one: the poor officer is no longer reduced, for want of means of transport, to the dry biscuit allowed by the regulations to him as well as to his men, he is no longer jealous of his brother officer who possesses three mules, drinks excellent claret, and opens at his breakfast boxes of fine preserves. Instead of ten cooks diverted from the service in a battalion, one only, with two or three helps, will suffice to prepare food for one or two numerous messes. Mess furniture and beasts of burden in common, capable of being divided in case of detachment, replace at a small cost, owing to the number, the individual means, so
insufficient and yet so costly, for an officer reduced to his pay and his extra allowance in campaign.

A caterer, appointed by turn, directs the mess and its expenses: these are provided for by a daily subscription fixed by the chief of the corps and regulated by the circumstances; it is increased by the field allowance when the government grants that.

In one or two companies, or one or two squadrons in detachments, the captains may fare with the lieutenants and ensigns, but never let any one dispense with faring with his comrades.

**Baggage.**

The organization of the officers' baggage is of great importance, because on the one hand, the welfare of the service requires that they should have a sufficient amount of it to provide for the necessary keeping
up of a good appearance, and for some comforts, without which they could not easily preserve in a rough campaign both vigor and health,* and because on the other hand, this baggage should be limited as much as possible, on account of the trouble caused by numerous convoys, either through the food of the beasts of burden, or of draught, the escort they require or the delay they occasion.

In obliging the officers to fare together they will be better off, and require fewer conveyances, especially if uniformity in the number and size of the tents is established.

* Through want of a good organization at starting, the officers in the Crimea first suffered considerably, and afterward, in order to remedy privations of all sorts, the government incurred enormous expenses, which would have been spared if more foresight had been used in the preparations. The human frame is not of iron, and to avoid sickness and death that finally amount to a great pecuniary loss, it is necessary to see at the beginning of a war that the men have all the comforts compatible with the exigencies of the operations in view.
A tent with a square base of 8 feet is sufficient for a captain or two lieutenants or ensigns; a canteen for each officer for his clothes, and one between six or seven for the service and mess requisites, making altogether 26 canteens of luggage and 6 mess canteens, for a battalion numbering 26 officers. These 32 canteens, besides two large tents for dining, require 17 mules besides one for casualties. Every mule carrying two canteens, can, in addition, receive a small tent and its paraphernalia. The surgeon places his tent on the ambulance mule belonging to the battalion.

In a regiment of cavalry numbering 34 officers, for four squadrons, one should allow six mules more than for a battalion.

Two mules should be allowed for majors and lieutenant-colonels, three for colonels, six for major-generals and chiefs of the staff of a division, 8 for lieutenant-generals and chiefs of the staff of a corps of army: a wagon with two horses could be substituted for three mules, and a wagon with
one horse for two mules, for field and general officers.* But as carriages considerably lengthen the columns, they should be absolutely prohibited to subalterns.

According to the foregoing rules an army of 100,000 men would have but 4000 mules for baggage, a very small number if compared with that of horses and carriages allowed by Frederick the Great, so severe on that point, or even with that hitherto usually employed in Algeria, during the great expeditions, where every officer had at least one mule, sometimes two or three, without taking into account that three-fourths infantry officers had chargers.

Through thus regulating the baggage the following result will be obtained, viz.:

*In France the regulations allow the general more carriages and mules than they actually employ. The number we propose is amply sufficient, since the complete disappearance of that extravagance of equipages which has been sometimes observed, as for instance under Louis XVth. This extravagance is no longer compatible with the means of officers of high rank, who now rise through merit and not through birth.
the extra allowance in campaign, now very insufficient, will become less so, especially if a retinue is prescribed for the purchase in common by the corps of the beasts of burden, tents and canteens, conformably to a specified pattern and number. But it would be still better if government were to provide all these things itself, for if it is even practicable, at the opening of a campaign, to purchase all of them in common with the allotted sum, it would become very difficult to replace them whilst the war lasts, seeing that the extra allowance is not renewed. Besides, how could justice be observed in case of death, exchange, promotion, etc.? Now-a-days, when officers are less wealthy than a century ago, when even most of them are without fortune, it is very difficult for them to avoid debts, unless the government provide for all their wants, at least with the subalterns, since it is proved that at the time when all the nobility had the privilege of dying on the field of battle, it
completely ruined itself through this privilege, in providing for its wants in time of war.

With a good system of tents and canteens for officers, and of "tentes d'abri" for the men, bivouacking could be more frequently performed in Europe now than under Napoleon, without losing so many men through sickness; and the operations would be less impeded than when it is necessary to canton or stop in towns, which scatters the troops, exposes them to surprise, causes defeats, and destroys discipline.

Of Guerillas or War of Partisans.

The word guerillas brings to the memory of the French the sad recollection of unfortunate soldiers, martyred for having committed no other crime than allowing themselves to be surprised, whilst fulfilling their duty toward their country. There are unjust aggressions of nations upon na-
tions, but the army that perpetrates them, being the mere agent and the irresponsible instrument of the government, the acts of which it supports, cannot justly be outlawed, as long as it itself does not infringe the law of nations. If therefore we speak in this book of the means employed by the bands of Espoz-y-Mina,* or of those

*Espoz was at first engaged to take care of the mules of Mina, his nephew, a poor student, sprung from the lower ranks of the Spanish nation, and who became one of its first guerilla chiefs. Mina, having been captured and sent to France, where he remained six years, a prisoner at Vincennes, his uncle, a man of no education, but of prodigious energy and strength, replaced him in the command of the bands of Navarre, and in order better to establish his authority, he added to his name that of Mina, already popular. Without any real military talents, but skilful in preparing ambuscades, the uncle and the nephew caused much mischief to the French, a great number of whom they either took or killed. Cruel to excess, they became as terrible to the armies of Napoleon I. as to those of their countrymen called Afrancesados, who did not serve their views as they wished; and one must see from several of their deeds, marked by atrocious barbarity, that they would
that were recommended to them, it is not to urge our readers to imitate, but to beware of them. It is in fact to be apprehended that in an invasion, weakness turning into despair, or in a civil war hatred reaching its paroxysm, we should see the renewal of those cruelties and barbarous expedients that have so frequently tarnished the pages of history.

Ambuscades, crows'-feet, war-spiders, trous de loup, rockets and incendiary projectiles, burning fascines or blocks of rock thrown upon an enemy crossing a defile, however terrible these means of destruction may be, they are recognized by the law of nations, and partisans as well as regular troops may employ them.

The means which are condemned, and against which we must nevertheless take precautions under certain circumstances,

not have shrunk at poisoning the enemy “en masse.” Espoz-y-Mina was successively, according to his interests, absolute royalist, liberal, revolutionist, constitutionalist, and rose to the rank of captain-general.

17*
are the poisoning of the air and food, the adulteration of provisions to render them somniferous and debilitating, the projection of acids, in a word, the use of all poisons.

The air may be poisoned by arsenicated canisters, filled with sulphur, charcoal, and arsenite of potash, and thrown by guns in order to explode in the midst of the enemy. They produce deleterious vapors causing colics and sickness. The English, it is said, employed them against the camps of Boulogne in 1803.

The springs may be poisoned by arsenic. But it is especially in wines, and liquids in barrels, that an implacable enemy could insert injurious substances, as undisciplined soldiers or those that are allowed to plunder, rush to the cellars, and it is there that revenge might prepare its poisonous machinations, such as opium in small doses, to produce torpor, salts of soda or other ingredients to cause diarrhoea.

Bullets provided with a brush of lint,
steeped in juices intended to envenom the wounds, have been pointed out as a necessary item of the guerillas' arsenal, as well as shells barely covered with earth, and bursting under the feet of the doomed men. Fire is communicated to these by phosphorus wicks, contained in thin tubes, bursting on the slightest pressure; or by detonating powder spread over hard matter, which ignites by the friction, or the weight of shoes armed with nails; or by phials of sulphuric acid, which, being broken under the feet of horses, spread their contents on mixtures of chlorate of potash, which they cause to detonate.

If it is permitted to hope that actual civilization will oppose with horror the poisoning of men, it may yet be feared lest attempts should be made to destroy horses, the indispensable auxiliaries of armies. It is therefore always necessary, before employing the forage or the corn left by the enemy, to ascertain that there is nothing to injure the animals. The
racks and mangers should also be examined, as they might have been rubbed with arsenic. The water of the tanks should be tried before use. One should expel from stables and bivouacs any inhabitant who, under any pretence, endeavors to enter them. A simple needle, buried in the eyes or in certain tender parts of horses, unfits them for service, without it being at first perceived that they are wounded.

Little need be feared from guerillas and partisans, if detachments are abstained from, if care is taken that the men do not wander, if a severe discipline is kept up, and if we act always with considerable masses; the only rational plan in a war of invasion.

Of the Law of Nations and the Usages of War.

The law of nations is not universal: it is scarcely admitted by the whole of the
European nations, and it is unknown or disregarded on the greater part of the other continents. As a code it is not always respected. If one of the contending powers breaks through it, the civilized nations do not usually take up arms to avenge its violation, and the adversary thus becomes entitled to free himself from it. Besides, the saying: "Necessity has no law," or "Salus populi suprema lex," sometimes commands the position so thoroughly, that a patriotic general does not hesitate to place himself above the customary rules, as far as those rules have been made by men. He then obeys what might be called the "law of war," which law places itself above all others, but respects the life of inoffensive people.

Nevertheless it is necessary to know the law of nations, and to observe it in its chief points, even with enemies who do not respect it, whenever the success of the operations is not compromised by this adherence to the existing contracts.
As for the usages of war, they vary with the times, the manners and the people, and many of them, although countenanced, are unfortunately not such as a delicate conscience could unscrupulously conform to, even under the most imperious circumstances.

But above necessity and above the usages of war, are the rights of humanity, to which both general and private must faithfully submit.

Neutrals are those who declare that they decline, in any way whatever, to participate in the war, and who in reality conform to their engagement. Their territory is (by right) inviolable:* they have the right of trading with all the nations,

* Often the territories of neutrals have been violated. A general who believes himself obliged, in the interests of his country, to attempt such a deed, must at least maintain a strict discipline among his troops; give the inhabitants no ground for complaint, and grant liberal damages for the injury, more or less real, he may have caused them.
friends or foes, provided it be not contraband of war.

(The contraband of war consists of all that can be of immediate use for the hostile army, or that is specially destined for it: as arms, ammunitions, horses, prepared provisions, clothing, and equipment, etc., but the purchase of food, corn, or horses, which do not appear to be necessarily intended for the enemy, cannot equitably be interdicted to neutrals.)

The neutrality of a nation ceases, not only as soon as it voluntarily shares in the war, even indirectly, but as soon as, having suffered an act that violates its neutrality, it does not protest against it, according to its forces and resources.

Between regular governments, mutually recognized, a declaration of war is proper, although not compulsory. A simple rupture of diplomatic relations is sufficient to justify acts of hostility on either part. With revolutionary governments, not recognized, or with nations generally held as
barbarous, all preliminary measures, indicating the commencement of war, may be dispensed with. A real injury authorizes, then, an immediate recourse to arms.

We are bound to signify to neutrals the beginning of hostilities. Until it is officially declared, they may provide the enemy with contraband of war. The law of nations forbids the destruction of an enemy by medicated arms or bullets, as well as by any other poison. It tolerates, however, the suffocation by the deleterious gases issuing from mines, as well as many other terrible means; such as showers of boiling oil, burning darts, splinters of bombs and shells, the wounds of which are very difficult to heal. Humanity forbids all that is cruel, it allows less than the law of nations. It is granted that the chief of an army can levy contributions on a hostile territory, in order to obtain money or munitions of all sorts, necessary for the maintenance of his army.

It is not forbidden to make forages,
when the proximity of the opponent forces, or the ill-will or the flight of the inhabitants, prevents the recourse to regular taxation. A general, animated with sentiments of honor, exacts contributions only in the strict measure of his wants; he takes every possible precaution to avoid all exaction and violence on the part of his subordinates. War authorizes, in some instances, plundering a citizen, but it is a revolting cruelty to torture him, or to inflict hard treatment upon him, to compel him to confess the place where his provisions or his money are hidden.

All that belongs to the hostile army, or is destined for it, as provisions, ammunition, cattle, forage, clothing, etc., is justly the prey of the conqueror, but nothing ought ever to become private booty. The custom which concedes to a man the horse he has taken, is vicious in a moral point of view, and in a military light it offers more inconveniences than advantages.
Every thing taken from the enemy must be marked in an inventory, distributed, if circumstances permit, or sold, and the produce of the sale divided among the captors, according to predetermined rules.

Except in the cases of taxes, contribution, or absolute necessity, the law of nations requires that private property, of all sorts, be strictly respected: any infraction in that respect must be punished as plundering or pillage. If the country is compelled to lodge and keep the invading armies, an equitable stipulation must fix what will be allowed to every officer, and to every man. It is inhuman to deprive the poor of his cottage, or of his small means of existence. Whosoever exacts more than has been stipulated, is guilty of extortion.

The personal and real property of the hostile nation, which is not destined for the army, does not belong at once to the conqueror. It is only at the conclusion of peace, and in virtue of special articles, that the lands, fortresses, establishments,
objects of art, etc., can pass into the hands of him who reaps the benefit of the war.

Razzias are executed only against reputed barbarians, among whom they are habitual. The plea for their execution is to be found, first, in the custom itself of those nations, and secondly, in the fact that every individual usually sharing in the hostilities, is, so to speak, part of the army against whom war is waged.

If one does not wish to receive the bearer of a flag of truce, the law of nations requires that before he be treated as an enemy, due notice be given to him to retire. The usages and the law of war agree to spare the lives of prisoners and to treat them according to their rank, and in a proper manner, according to the resources at hand. They must neither be compelled to work, nor be obliged to perform any military duty whatever. Humanity forbids us to injure the wounded, or to murder the prisoners, even under the pretence
of reprisals. These must never go so far as to attempt the lives of men: they are scarcely to be exercised on any ground.

The usages of war authorize us sometimes to take hostages, but it is an extremity to which recourse must be had only in a case of great importance. Their life is sacred; captivity, and the temporary sequestration of their property, are the only injuries they must suffer, and their condition must in other respects be alleviated as much as possible. The usages of war also authorize us to seize upon men to act as guides, when none come forward.

The usages of war require that all persons, or private or public property, placed under safeguard, should remain free from the taxes of war. Safeguards, however, are only so far valid as agreements or contracts between the contending powers have specified their nature, and that of the persons or objects capable of receiving protection.

A king, or a chief invested with high
authority, when taken prisoner, must be treated with the greatest consideration, should he even belong to a barbarous nation.

The law of nations requires that a truce should be respected in all its conditions, during the time for which it has been agreed upon, if the duration has been fixed, or as long as the reopening of hostilities has not been announced, if the truce has been agreed upon for an unlimited period. Every general acting singly can conclude a truce, but its effects are only binding on the troops under his command. A truce does not require to be ratified, unless it contains conditions equivalent to preliminaries of peace.

Honor requires that a capitulation, even a compulsory one, be faithfully executed without aggravation toward the party who suffers it. A capitulation is a treaty, more extensive than a truce; with this the "status quo" is usually observed, with that, one of the parties obtains positive advantages.
Every general, within his sphere of action, can grant a capitulation, but if it contains articles likely to bring about the end of the war or some other serious event, it must be ratified, unless full power has been given to the parties who sign it. When the ratification is necessary, clear mention of this must be made in an especial article (*).

(*) When Abd-el-Kader in 1847 surrendered to the French on condition of being transported to the East, he did not know that the capitulation he signed was of such a nature as to require a ratification by King Louis Philippe. Therefore, however desperate his situation was when he capitulated, he could argue that good faith had not been observed toward him.
EPilogue.

MENTion has scarcely been made in this book of the operations detailed in other works under the name of minor operations of war, such as ambuscades, detachments, forages, convoys, etc. This is not an oversight. It is because these operations, good perhaps with an enemy inexperienced and ignorant, are very dangerous in presence of an experienced and vigilant foe, and because most of them necessitate exposing, in forming detachments, a part of one’s forces, a circumstance always very critical, and the results of which are seldom in proportion to the risks.

But little has been said of posts and positions, because with the actual extent and organization of armies, the war treated under the name of “war of posts and of positions” would generally fail before a system of rapid marches and movements.
Finally, if little space has been given to the diversity of the orders of battle, treated of at such great length in a few works, it is because these orders methodically combined on paper are often impracticable, either owing to circumstances of time and ground or to the enemy’s movements.
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